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INTRODUCTION

As one 810w11 turna the page. of the history at
philosopbJ, the names of men

~o

made exceptional contribu-

tions to the ph11osophical tllought ot their day an d age stand
out ln large letters above the small print ot the rest or the
page.

Thes. are the names one is wont to remember; they leave

an impression on one's mind; they influence man' 8 1nnermost
thought 1n one wsf or another.
Two such names, printed in the bold t"e

or

all the

history ot philosophy books, easl1.,. imprint themselves in the
memory of every reader.

The one, Plato, is a nama found in

the very early pages ot every history book.
..... aning-' age

or

He lived in the

philosophical thinking J he has lett a de-

r in! te mark on the character ot philosophy. He was

t,lle

'be-

ginning ot a tradition, the beacon light that lit the way into

1

2

hitherto impenetrable philosophical realms ot knowledge.

As

the pages ot the history of philosophy are slowly turned, the
nanes ot countless philosophers, enlightened by this Platonic
beacon, appear on page atter page.

Manr

mo~e

pages have to be

turned -- more than eight oenturies had gone by -- bet ore the
name ot a man tho exalted that tradition to heights unatta1ned
before his time appears.

The man whose influence fts as a

guide post marking the completely fin1shed
tonic tradition was DiOD7sius the
Both these men, Plato

III

co~s.

ot the Pla-

~eopagite.

d

Dion7sius, were interested

In explain1ng not on17 the things the,. sawall around them:-

selves, but even more than that, the ultimate cause ot all
things. 1 They never rested and we~
. never . satisfied until
their minds rested in an ultimate,

8.

unity, that would be the

keystone of their philosophioal thought.

Now both these men

discovered these ke7Btones and lett in writing their deoisions
_. what the ke.,stones are, bow they came to the knowledge of
them, and how they hold together the arch of their particular

slst ema.
For Plato, the .keystone was the notion ot the Supreme

1 G. i'h~ry, "Scot Erlgene. Introducteuzt de Dell'1S," The"New
Scholastlclam, Waahington, Cathblic Ull1verait7 PreS81.-rt1..3)
'01. VI!, g6. Also J\1l1us Stenzel! Plato' a Xethod or m.a:.
lectic, Clarendon P:reas, oxtord, 1':l4tJ, 6.
-

Good, he bu1lt his system stone by stone until tinall,. he was
read,. to put into its unique place the tinal stone, the Supreme
Good. 2

This is the tr.a~ent ot Plato's philosophy as found

1n the now monumental lCrk, the

R,eebli~.

-I

Centuries]a tar,

Dion'1sius, with a more keenly theological outlook,)

completed

h1 s arch in ,much the san e wa'1.
ibus he has lett a bluepr11'1t ot the arobi teotural struoture

ot his philosophy. 4 The import81 ce ot this e1ght century gap

.

betw.een the lives ot these two philosophers cannot be min1m1aed,

tor during that time Chr1stianity
was born and. grew to sturd,.
.
stature.

Tmla D1onys1ue, himself' a Christian:
had in Christ,

ian1t1' a system ot ohecks and balances, undre8Jl ed ot 1n the

or

age

hia predeceasor.
Because the influence ot these two men fta aounlque,

a comparative study ot what each considered the apex at his
work 1s apropos.

Already man,. great philosophers ..... the1r

number 1s legion -- have made soholarly pronouncements about
what Plato said and thought.
perfect harmony_
1

I

Needless to 881, all are not in

A revi •• ot the h1gh points ot the1r finding.,

mere11 with regard to the runction or the Supreme Good, will
be the aim ot the first part or this paper.
To very man,. savant • • t ph1losoPh7, even

~

their

intel'ests :may have carried them deep into the lab)':rinthine ways

at philosoph,.f the name or Dlonyalu8 means no mol'O than just
the name ot another little knDyn

~h11osophel'~'

The few facts

that can be gleaned trom varlou. recent sources about his lite
cast an oblitel'atlng shadow over the halo that had been placed
above his head by many ot the people o£ the MlddleAges.

ever, what little 1s known ot his 11te

How-

is very intere.ting

and augments conslderabll the lntel'est that has been aroused
by the few extant works we know are his.

These tew scattered

tacta, theretore, that are known about him wUl be

&

valuable

asset to this study ot Dion1sius and a fitting introduction
to the analysis or his phllo80ph,..
After a ve17 brier lntroduction to Dionyslus the man,

a a,noptie sketch

of his theodlcy 1't 11 be·· given wi th especlal

emphasis placed on "goodness" .a the f iI4St name of God.

This

is not misplaced emphasis because, as shall be seen, the name
"goodness" to Dlonyslus is the most fundamental
divine

or

all the

nartl6S.

Finally, after an analysis of the indiv1dual doctrines ot the two men has been given, a comparison wll1 be made

between the basic points of theIr works

80

that, it possible,

the princ1ple of identi t1 can be found in the doctrine of the
two :men.

Th1a w1l1 be of special Intel'est because it wUl lead

to the olue that prompted EtIennG Gl1son to wrIte: "The God at
Dlon1s1us, then, resembles the Idea of the Good or whioh Plato
wrote in his work the ReJ!Ubllc."5

This will lead, then, to

the discover,. of the point of identity between the two that
provoked Gilson to write of the marked ldenti t,. in t hell' writ.
Ings.
It would be impossible in the limited space of this..(

study to give . a complete,
. comprehensive analysis ot these two
men. Ideally, perhaps, this would be the most
. plausible
. wal
to establish the identity_

What can be done, however, is to

establish an identity in a very basic poInt that necessitates
a similarity in a score of other points.

1s firmly proved, the other points ot
because the,. tollow

or

Once this identIty

stm1~arity

must be there

necessity_

Such is the plan ot lttt£ck 01: this paper.

The pivotal

pOint of identity 1'1111 bet the idea of c;oodnass in the works o£
•

F

_. .

a

Dieu de Denrs re~.emble alor~
l'Idee du Bien decrite
par Platon dans sa Republlque." Etienne'al1son. La Philo'ophie Au Moyen Age, Parot, Paria, 1947, 82. (Urth. li'igllah
translations In the follOWing pages are the author's own.
unless otherwise speoified.)

S "t.

6
the two men.
is basic.

For both these philosophers tho ide.of goodness

The locus classicus tor Plato'. treatment 1s Book

VI ot the Republic; to this section of the ROEub11c as tar
as is possible,tb1s study w11l be lim1ted.

For Dionysius

th~

treatment 1s not so succinct. However, most of what he says
can be t ound 1n Chapter IV of the 12.!.

1)1 v1nlp

...
}ro
....nl.....1...ni
.........
b...,u..
s. From

these two limited sections, then, most of the compar1son will
be made.
A legitimate retort ot all this 1ntroductory matter

ot discuss10n comes to m.ind almost immediately.

Why all tb1s

d1scuss1on and weishins ot opinions of two men Who are just so
many names in the history of ph1losoph1?

But both Plato f:lJld

Dionys1us are much more tll8l1 just nam.es in a h1stoIT book'
It must not be t'orgot.ten that Plato st .. ted a tradition that
has not d1ed even to th1 s da7 m d hu inspired the minds of
great men from his own t1me to the present.

Plato may have

passed away; to ll'18.D7 he may be just another naae in a history

book.

But Plato started a ball rolling, and because ot the

impetus he gave it, it 1s still rol11ng at the present time.

low the tradit10n thai nato started was oarried on
tor

manr

yoars unt1l t1Jaa brought 1 t a pertect10n that was

undreamed ot by Plato.

This perfection of Platonic ph1losopb7

-7
_s due to an amalgam ot Platonic philosophy "- th a Christ1an
theology.

Quite evidently. this was not a perfect amalgam,

nor did it answer all the difficu1tles that an,. such amalgamation would entall.

But at lea.st it was attempted.

The success

of the enterprise ls still &matter ot dispute among grea.t

thinkers.

True, it was the result of many years or development

and the work o£ many philosoph'e;x's, allot.' whom pla:1ed their
parts in its development.

The work of

a~ost

all thBse philo-

sophers, called Neoplaton1sts today, influenced in v&171ng
degrees this flnal amalgamation.

Such an amalgam took place both 1n the Latin and in
the Greek tradition.

The

fo~er

was due chiefly to the gentus

of Saint Augustine; hi' influence in clarifying the theology

of the Catholio Cbureb and of inspiring others 1s well known.
Among the Greek Fathers the tradition 1s not
the Latin tradition.

80

well known ...

By tar the most important factor that

influenced & Platonic tradition on the intelleotual heritage
of the Latin Middle Ages, was the corpus
ings.

Qr

Dionysian writ-

Because this influence was from a Greek school, 1twas

not as pronounoed as the Latin influence.

However, 1n the

11ght of the detaIled recent research, it. importance 1s beoOming more and more evldent. 6

-6

Raym-:>nd nlbanslq" 'rhe continu1t~ ot the Platonic TradItion,

The Warburs Institute, '£Onden, r)1J;

z-:

..

F

a
Agatn, that this influence was of Platonic heritage

is of importance.

Otten, because

or

the brilliant glow ot

Aristoteliam8m, the tlashing brilliance ot the Platonic luminaries is lost sight ot.

Yet, even the genius ot Saint Thomas

saw the importance ot the Platonic teachings.
The two chief eXpOflents ot the Latta and

at

the Greek Cbr1atian branches ot the indirect tra.d1 tion, Augustine and Den'18 the Aeropagi te, combine trom the nlnth eenttu.'7' to
torm, U it were, an element which may be "
termed th& Christian transformation of Neeplatan1~, the eftect ot which 18 telt
throughout; the I.!iddle Ages and \1hich even in
Saint Thomas 18 powertu.l enough to limit and
counterbalance 1n a VIEW' ~is strict f..rlstotellam_.1

How when one considers to wbat extent Salnt Thomas
was able to carry the philosoPhical notions

or

Aristotle 1n hi.

analysis at Christlan theology, one i . inclined to tb1nk that
Saint Thomas' solution to the problem is the only pe:rtect solution.

This mayor ...,. not be true f'

remembered is this.

~e

point that l1I1st be

The reason why the great minds ot the

Middle Age. were able to get as taP along the road ot tl-Uth . .

th&7 did was that the,. took up wbare the earlier philosophers
had lett ott.

on

'.

a completel,. wrong road, even the gl"eat*3st minds

•

7

It the earlier th1nkers had alread'y sta:rbed

d

~.,

21.

II!

w~uld.

ott
have

9
bad great difficulty to bring themselves to end on the right
road.

The,. might even have found this imposs1ble.

.

Medieval

thought succeeded in bringing the earlier thought, especially

the thought of the Greeks, to its point of perract10n mainly
because the earlier thought

W8.3

alread7 1n many ronpects true. 8

.

Christian thinkers took up theso t :ru.ths, and vi th tho aid of:
Christian revelation, opened up new vistae and pointed to new
horizons that the earlier thinkers never thought ot.
thin1e rB

Christian

progressed as rapidly as they d1d only because ot

. this earlier groundwork.

"VJhen they raised the problem of the

origin of being, Plato and Aristotle

wer~

on the right road.

and it 1s prec1sely b eCQU8e they Vi ere on the right road that
to go further along was progress."9

.

It was just suoh a task that Dlonyslu. took upon
• elf.
USe

h1Ju.,.

With a completel,. Platonic "background, Dion7s1ua made

ot that baokground in a completel,. Chr1stian theological

ml11eu. 10

DlanJS1u8 had taken the pagan notions ot Plato uh1ch

had been mod1.r1ed to a great extent by the Weoplatonists and
lifted them out ot the1x- laval ot TIellel11am into tho healthy
atmosphere of Chrlet1s.n theod1cy.

-

Whether Dioll7oius succeoded

10
completely in his

endeavo~s

1s open to quest1on, his oryptlcal

phraseology lends 1tself to various Inte~pratations.l1 That
Dlonysius ll1ade such an attempt 1s laudable and becauso this
attempt was, as we now know,
a comparative analysis.

U

Ibid.,

94.

or

lInporta.nce, it is worthy 0'£

L

CHAPTER II

THE S U'.PREJ\~E GOOD AS F otllm Dl

PLATO'S REPUBLIC
J

The first loOk into the books, pamphlets, and articles
wi tten to explain the bas 1e notions of the philosophy

ot Plato,

makes one conclude that thE" plethora ot material 18 aeemingl,.
overwhelming.

only after a careful 'anal,.tic study i8 it evident

that all the matter groups 1 tIel! around a few central ideas.
Oval" theae ideas commentators take a pro or

8.

con position.

Once these bas1c notions and central 1deas are understood quite

well, the baokbone ot Platonism

&~C

the structure of Plato'.

work are evident.
'"-

One suoh bfi810 notion is the ide. of the good

in the ll.e2Bb11c.

U

found

That it 1s the central metaphysical doetr1.ne

11

hn

12

of the Republic l and the most extensive aspect of Plato's theo~

ot ideas,2 there can be no doubt.

Whether or not Plato changes

his tdeas in his later dialogues does not effect this study.
The primart interest of this analysis is going to be oentered
on this doctl"lne of the good as found tn the Repub,.lli.

Th:ts

dialogue, philosophers agree, presents an excellent conspectus

ot the e&r17 stages ot Plato1s entire phtlonophical S7steM.3
It is in t..1)is dialogue that the;· doctrine of the good., \1I'hlc..'l

.

rounded off Plato's own sch0r:10 ot p;ltlosophy, was first ('X-

pounded.

It is this doctrine that has inspired philosophers

since tho day it first met the <lager ears of ;Plato's fo110w81"s.
A brief summary of the pas sage in wh1 eh the idea of

good is expla1ned in the R6PublJ..~4 .11 make Plato. s ideas

the

of the good more intelligible.

Socrates, the mouthpiece of

Plato in this dialogue) is explaining his ideas to a few followers.

what
•

He asks his listeners what the gres.test study 1s and

stUdy

'T

t

I

J

moet properly be longs to the gue.rdlan

• u

or

the stat e •

• #

"

1 A.E. TA,.lor. ~ '!atg, l.a!.!en s! ~~s Work., Methuen and Co.,
London, 19~, a~.
*
2 Jul1us·Stenael,...,Ela.to t s Method of D!aleotlct Olarendon Press,
Oxtord, 11940 ij,£; .'.' ,
· - ,- .
~

.

I.'

T

•

•

3 Paul More •. ~ton1"f Princeton Press. Princeton, 1926, 312.
4 Plato; fuU!L,'~ , >~ t. All quota.tions 1'1111 be taken r rom.
Plato, tSe n~~11C, transl. by raul Shorey; ad. by tho Loeb
~assieULISrar1 •. Itarvard University Press, Cambridge, 1935.
Whenever nee.seary, the Greek text will be adde4.

13
The answer he gives is the study ot the idea ot the good.

This

is clearly dist1ngu1shed tram the study of mere pleasure and
trom mere intellectual knowledge.

ot the

Sup~maGood,

On this one point, the nature

Socrates tells his listeners that most men

are almost completely in the dark.

This ultimate good is the

one thing that the guardian ot the state should how the most
about.
Socrates baa now succeeded 1n gett1ng his listeners
attentive.

Their ears prick up; what 18 this good Socrates 1.

talking about? For the moment, the most that Soeratescan do
i8 explain the conception ot the good by an analog.,..
parison 1s very simple,

The com-

The Supreme Good is to the intelligible

order what the sun 18 1n the visible world.
comparison are made. First,

~st

Two main points

or

as the sun 1s the source ot

vis10n 1n the eye and ot vis1bility in the thing seen, so the
Supreme Good 1s both the source ot intelligence in the mind and
intelligibility in the thing understood.

Secondly, as the sun

1s the source ot actual generation and ot growth ot the organic
world, so the Supreme Good radiates truth and knowledge, and 1.
actuall.,. the .ouree ot lite and being in the "o1'ld.5

5 lettleship, 236.

L

In like manner, then, lou are to
sal that the objects ot knowledge not onll
recai ve t rom the presence ot the good their
being known, but their verl existence and
essence 1s derived trom it to them, though
the good itself is not essence but still
transcends essence in dignitl and surpassing power. 6
//
It i8 well to remember that what concerns t his stud"

mostot all 1s the point of comparison and not whether the theor"

at light and vision ot Plato as he conceived it was accurate or
not.

What should be particularly noted is the length to whioh

Plato goes at this point ot the dialogue to make the comparison
~etween

the Supreme Good in the order ot intellisibllity and the

sun in the order of ne re sense.

Once Plato haa descr1bed both the position and tunctiom
of the Supreme Good aa he see it, be goes on to explaln the steps

through which the human mind passes tram the lowest scale, which

is complete ignorance ot the Supreme Good, to the swmmit ot the
perfectlon ot intellIgence, which is the complete knowledge ot
the Supreme Good.

Once agm. n he compares hIs position to the

degree of light that can illumine an object ot sight, from complete darkness to the luminous brillianoe of noonday sunlight.
This he represents to his listeners by a very obvious scale 01"

.ental states which he tries to balance completely and perfoctly

6 .H.e pUbllc, 509B.

-

with the scales ot objects ot thought.

He sa18:

~nep~esent

them

then, as it were, by a line divided into two unequal sections and,
cut each section again into the same ratio (the section, that ls,

ot the visible and that ot the intelligible order }.tf17

The

toU%'

stages are represented by the divided line, and. as he goes on

The

ti~8t

stage i. mere conjecture -

:>
,
&tl(cfL(i"(..c:(,.

It

represents a state ot mind, the objects ot which are mere imagesI

in contrast to the second stage -IT,,6",,-s -- in which the mind has
a deeper reeling

around it.

ot certitude about the actual tangible things

Plato explains his meening clear17:

Dr tmages I mean, first, shadows and
then reflections in water and on surfaces of'
dense, smooth, and' bright textuz.e, md every.
thing ot that kind, it you apprehend ••• As the
second seotion assume that ot'which this is a
likeness or an image, this is, the animals about
us and all Peants and the w bole class of obJeots
made by man.·
.
.
To these two stages or the workings ot the mind, then, are attributed quite a number or separate and apparently independent objects, each or which has a purpose and position all its own in
the sensible world.

These two states correspond to what would

be called, in scholastic terminolog7, the world ot partioulars,
inoluding both the partioular thing and the knowledge ot that

-

-16
particular thing.
The division more difficult to understand, and whlch
is 01' more interest to this study, 1s the second and upper division 01' the divided line.

This division consists 01' two parts;

There 18 one section or it which the soul is
oa.,pelled to investige br treat1Dg as images
the things Wtated in the tomer division
and by means at usumptlona trom which 1t
proceeds not up to a first principle but
down to a conclusion, while there i8 another
section in which it advances trom i t8 assumptions, and in whlcb 1t makes no us. of the
images employed by tbe other section, rel.,.ing on ideas only 8Qd progressing systematically through ideas.'I
The distinction between theseturo stages is this.

..

.tage,
and'

1,,:'vOLt4.
•
.

axioms,

depends upon various prlnciples, laws, theorems,
.
a 11 called "bJpotheses," b'1 which t he nature ot the
,

particulars known tromthe two tormerare better known.

,

The tormer
'

"
stages,e t .l<:""(1"L,,and

The tinal and highest stage of knowledge,

~

vo,..,,.,s,

is a perfect state 01' intelligence which would use the

postulates at J,1vo,~as mere starting points snd go on to the

.

d1scovery

or

"pr-1nciple ot

.

more ultimate premises, or tinally, to the real
eve~h1ng."

once this tinal principle had been

deduced by this process ot building up to 1t, the "way up" 01'
the earlier philosophers, then, by another prooess, the "way

-9

SlOB-C.

~

,
7Tttr"St

-17

.

down" oi'i:lhe earlier philosophers, a1:';' tho consoquences that VJoul(
fo110\,,1 from. such a first pI'inciple, which vlould be deduced.

No

appeal woulli be made to t;he sensible world, manifestod in the

Use would be m.ade only ot "pure ideas, moving on
th:,,"ouGh ideas and ending w.i. th ideas.-10 The object, then, ot

fOI"mer s"l'ailges.

this highest stage of knowledge is the Supreme GoodJ to this
supreDe Good all things are related.

In this does the highest

stage ditter from the lower in which all things are related to

assumed h1Potheses.11

In the final stage there is a definite

unity, the unit1 brought by the superiority or the Supreme Good.

As a unity. the Supreme Good rises above the mere hypotheses ot
the

r ormar stage of knowledge and resut ts in t he pretect know-

ledge ot all things tor the human mlnd. 12

Plato goes on to relate the famouB "Allegory of the

Cave," in whioh he shows the position ot the human race in regard
to the stages

or

the d1vided 11ne, the staees ot knowledge.

The

allegory i8 important because ot its real relation to the d1vided line discussed above.

In the allegory

the prisoner set tree trom the cave and
gradually acoustomed to bear the strongest
light passes through a series at stages

10

5110 •.

U

Taylor, 291-292_

12 Wattleship, 258.
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which correspond generall,. to toot which
W.QS s,mbollzed by the d1 vided l1ne_1n the
preced1ng section or the argument.lJ
The t1nal ucent trom the oave 1s a tl.ll'1l1ng to the s un as it 1s
"1n and 01 itself 1n its own place. ft1
Once aga1n Plato has

4

compared the vision of the sun 1n t he sensible order to the
knowledge ot the Supreme Good in the intelligible order.
~i8oner

For the

released from the cave, the tinal ascent is to attain to

the knowledge of the Supreme Good.
But. at any rate, 1lf1 dream as it appears to
me 18 that in the region of the known the last
thing to be seen' and hardl,. to be seem is the
idea or the good, and that when seen it must
needs pOint us to the oonclusion that th1. 1s
indeed the caUSe ot- all things, of all that 1s
right and beaut1tul, giving birth in the visible
world to light, and t he author oE light and 1tselt 1n the intelligible world"be1ng the authe~
t1c source ot t ruth and reason, a net that all'1One
who is to act w1se17 1n pr1vate_gr in publio
must have oaught sight ot th1s.J.!1

iOnly

a very rew, tmd these

VI

lth

V617

muoh effort and struggle,

lever rise to the vision ot the s un and the contemplation of the
iSupreme Good.
Such 1s the sohematic outline ot Plato's treatment ot
the good.

'1'0 understand 1 ts relatl ve posl tlon in the soale ot

~o.ledge,

1 t 1s necesaaz-J to

II

tudy a little more closely the

19
importance of the Supreme Good in Plato's philosophlcal scheme •
•

The first important tact that arllOne who reads the

R~Rublic,

notioes 1s the predominance ot the Supreme Good by Plato.

Why

the Supreme Good should be the object ot the h1ghest stage

or

knowledge arouses onets curiosity.

A cause ot wender, too, is

how Plato gets into suoh a position ph1losophically as to have
to draw suoh a conclusion.

The nature ot the Supreme Good and

7 the other caUBes

or

tts relation to &1

is also

interest to.any-

one lIho wishes to understand Plato.

Each ot these problems,

therefore, mu.st be taken up individuall)" if further understanding
is expected.
It is not a mere matter ot choiee that leads Plato
~nto

assigning the primacy at his philosophical scheme toUle

~upreme

Good.

1a this.

Quite the contrary'

Plato's line ot reasoning

The man who baa attained real "wisdOlltt would see that

the reason why anything Is, and the reason why it Is what it ls,

would be 80me cause.
~8ted

Now in the entire ReEubllc Plato is Inter~/

in finding the ul tim.ate cause or man's actions.

What is

it that should stimulate the best man, the philosopher, as an
~'t

PlatO'1I conclusion is that the food 1s the desired aim of

~l men's actlons. l6 Nor does plato limit this teleological
~oncept to the actions ot m.en. The very same idea he applies

16 505s.

20

more un! ver.al11 not only to the aotlonIJ

or

men but to the ve1!f

nature of th1ngs, to all beings,Ethical actlon. then,

ftS

.fUse that 8et off thia explosive ide,," ln the philosophy

or

Th18 basl0, teleological oonceptlon of ethioal actlon 18
theme or the 11&190112.17

the
Plato.

t~€}

main

'fbla 1dea enables nato to explain why

all thins. -- not only the actlone ot lion but alao the very tangible things that 110 all around us l.n this universe -

8tr11'o

tor an end. All things, there.toN, tor Plato strive for an endJ
all thinss have Ita longing (i(pws) to maintatn thoml!lelve4 1n

their proper ttom t

(Z Go~).·16

If the good 18 tho cnuse or mant s actions, Plato
argues, 1t must be the ultimate cause ot all th1nsa, tJaterial and
1mmaterial as 11011,19

Plato never says that all thing. aro at

all conaclou$ of the Supreme Good: he nlel·aly aaya that Elll thing.

ultimatel,. to bo expla1ned and to 000 in the hlbb- a pons 1.ble solution to
-l\- f-lThis toleoloclcal approacb as

are so made

e.t good.

8.8

tho ;Pl'oblem of boing was the :reault of a long series ot' devolopmenta in Plato's phIlosophy, it was an ld,ea that goes bac!! a!ld
finds ita startIng polnt ln one or hiD earliest wortk8, the

IJlhaedot 20

l:=-------
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This basic notion/~f a teleological principle is

V8r-r

or Plat o's viewpoint. To under-

i;!1portant tor an understanding

stand why he made the Supreme Good so important in his philosoph,.
~s

to understand that plato had

fe~ryla1n

tou~

not oftly the immanent nature ot things

that would make a thing knowable.
~ooking

the unity b,.

mlch

b\'~.t ~.lpo

he could
the unity

For a long time he had been

tor just ~ a unitYJ hi. earlier dialogues are all avid-

fence ot t his fact.

1to1f 1n the

discovered and applied to his

ft~l!!blic

such a un! t7 is finally.

au~.m••yatem

T.b&t

ot philosoph,..

~i tl he h{ld

been looking tor, he t1nally found in the idea ot
~he Supreme Good. 21 This idea answered and solved many or the
~irtlcultles
~ut

he was not able to answer in his earlier dialogues.

unknown to Plato at the time of h1s writing of the l1eebl1o,

. Ithis solution was to bring" th it many new difficulties that
..ere equall,. instrumental. in »*king na·to revise hie ,osition in
~ater dialogues,
~ment,.

However, his solution did,. at least fel' the

solve hi. major d1fficult1es.
At the mOl.'lent it i8 diff1cult to aee what oonnect1on

ther~

is in the mind ot Plato between t he Supreme Good" 'ttl ioh

tor the present at least, seems to be someth1ng outs1de the thing

itself',. and:the good which i8 immanent in ttbe thing i teal!.

21 Stenzel,

42.

For

22
Plato the bridge that links the gap between the world of real
beings and the

wo:t~ld

of intellig1ble beings 1s a bJtldgo sus..

pended on thln, trasile, silk tibers.

It seems to snap just as

soon as anyone puts even a little pressure at analysis to it.
What Plato seems to say 1. s thi,!'J.

All

world of phenomena around us si:)ri va tor a good.

t~11ngs

in the

The reason for

this must be, quito evidently. that they all participate in some
single archet:n>e, which by the very nature of t he case must be
the Supreme Good.

Since all things strive for the Good cmd par-

ticipate in the good, their very being muct be exp1a:tned by
good.

th~

Furthermore, as the source ot all good, this final end

and atm of all things must be the Supreme Good, distinct from
all other things.

But all things strive for the good, each in

its own particular way.

The philosopher comprehends this by

a process ot: reasoning, the higbest stage ot human intelligence.
This prooess leads him to the knowledge ot the go04 of all

things.

Consequently, the Supreme Good is the oause

ot all things, and over and above

tr~t,

ot the being

the caUSe of their in-

telligibi11ty as well.22

It 1s. therefore, from. the idea of the
good that all reasoning about causes must atart. 23
At this point it 1s not too difficult to see What,

..

• "' •

p

, ----------------------------------------~
L

txeora all indtcations unknown to Plato, cauaed him

t1cultr.

80

much d1t-

Modern critics, with all the writings at Plato betore

#

thaa, oan read117 sa1 that Plato did not d1st1ngu1Sh
oarefully
.
.
betnen the real and the ideal ord~ and, u a result, can sa,.
that he ran into trouble 1n explaining .atisfactoril7 the prinoipl•• of oausa11tT.
go04 u

the object

Quit. obviousl,., J1.ato waa contusing the

at atrlv1ng and that in

source at 1ntoll1g1blllt'1.
tha t

the good 1b 1& 18 the

Suoh actuall,. waG t he case, and rot'

reuon, the Suprerao Oood pla.,-ed such a ve1:7' 1mportant role

1n the ~02!b.l~h

Barlter 121 this paper wben an explanation was given

or

the tataOua 41v1ded line of Plato, the intimate connection

ibetween the ob Jecta ot knowledge

and

the correspondtns stages

knowledge that go along a1de thea was cl.ar178 een.

I

r!

of

Even thoUlh'"'!

it 18 hard to t lnd the cl....cut distinction bet"ell the real

order and the lntell1g1ble order 1n the plan ot Plato, at111 1t
1a clear that tor Plato 1t 1s through thtl good that all tb1.nsIre to be known.

Until the. eooc! 1.8 known, the tNe nat'l..lnl

or

things 1s not rtf-all,. knoW'llt or at 18 nst the true nat"ure 1a not
Pmc)WJl.•

in 1ta entl:ret'1 and In ita r-elatlonah1p w1th other' th1ng.h

~7 an 1uge or a conjecture 1s had at 1 t.
•

The ultimate nature

'I..:

,

Until th1llga are

ot th18 SUpreme aood shall

be seen

tL/

.

la.ter. Par the px-8a8nt 1 t 1s enough to 8a'1 tbat in" language
of Plato, the Supreme Good DNSt be kno1m. tlret and t01'emoat. ':,
!he wwd ·8004" means that which an',7'thlng
18 meant to do or to bo. Tho u.se ot t he word

imp11•• a certain ultimate bypothea18 as to
the nattlX'o of tb1nsa,_ name17 that thol'e 111
reason operating 1n the world lnWlln, and
111 Dature, th18 reaaon ahoft t taelt e"17where 1n the world 1n th18 partioular -7,
that llboneyer there are a n\Db<u.lt or elemtmts
co-ext.tent, tb&re w111 be round a C$;rta:S.n
un1 t7, there 18 a eertaln pxt1nclple which
oo:-r.~ate. thea, t broush "hleh alone ther
are what they are, a:ad 11& the l1ibt of 1h loh
they oan bo UDderatood.ZIf.

Such an lnterpretatlon 18 the log1cal explanat10n
what Plato meana when he aa,... "7!h6 ob "aota

receive trom the presenoe

or

ot

or knowl8dge not 01"41'

the £;ood their being known, but the,.

receive the1r vel"7 existence and essence wbleh are derived to
them tram 1t. tt25 From 8uch a atatement the paralle11em bet.en
l~tot a

teleolog7 and the knoudge of a thingt s e8senoe 18 ve'rJ' }.

evident.
One thing more 1n this conneot lon must be mentioned
because it throw. more lIght on th1. Platonic doctrine.
thi8"

The primo importance

or

the teleologIcal not! on

It is

or

Plato ••

interpretation when applied to man .bows the vIJr'1 intimate link

-

I IU

•

•

... II • •

I. r

2>
111 the mind of Plato bet.en what pb11080pbera oall moral 1ty and
'rbe ideal for

knowledge.

:* n

can be expla1ned as "pel'tfect know-

edse and understanding or himsell and ot hi. 11re, or as peract

~r.rormance

1. a part_ n26

or

hi. true 1" unction in 111.8 world of wbioh be

Str1ctly apeak1nt, and 1n the l1t;ht ot what are

ona14.re4 common moral acts, Plato 1. not involved 1nmoral
qualitiea at all.

tIIen aira at an "object of deslre -- that
. 1b 10h

o moat want. tt27 !he good lite alma 8 t the worth7 end, the per-

action

or

ita being_

This 18 ita good, b7 this Plato mean a

that with wb1ch .omoth1~ 18 mad. good w1th1n

virtue (!t.p£n;) -

ita own epeci •••
The unity, then, that b1nda together intelligence and
the intelligible 18 the good.

It 18 the lingle archetype b7

1b lob the mind com.. to lnlOW the ob jeeta ot knowlodge and b7

which the •• object. rece1.e their very exi.tanee and easenc••
fh. quest10n that 10&108117 rollon th••• statements 1. thlfh
What 1. rea117 the natw.-. of the good tbat nato thue conce1ved

to pertona thts function?

In the light or nato"

limited tHat-

m.ent th1s que. tion "ball now be treated.

'0 ••• all
•

rt

t

I

II AI "

t

,

11.

thing. and to Stud7 them 1n the light

ot

!

the GOod it the function of the fOUI'th and lut .tage

lodee.

1i:now-

Such 1s tho task of the true philosopher, Plato m.ainta1ne.

When nato says that the
from t he presence

o~jocts

ot knowledge not onl,. receive

or the good theil' be1ng lmown .a well as

essence and e x1atence, he adds one more notch

side.:

or

n.

t beitt

at'firms be-

"The g oed ltGelt 18 not essence, but still tx-anaoenc18

esa.nee in dle;nlt7 . . IUl'pu81ns pow:-.8..··e But Gven bo.fore M

".a thta atat.ent he u.e1"tat
.
Thl. reallt,., then, that glves theIr tl'U.tb
to tho obJ.o~. of knowledge and the power
of knO'l'1..nS t:o tho ~. 'IOU _at ...,. 1.
the 14•• or the (;004 (lSt.'V- r.u ;')';.6>011 )
$n4 lOU ..... t oODCelve 1t .a bainG tho cauae
ot lm.owle4;e (<<~r:", .... J'l1Ti~';4J1S ) . 4 of
truth 1n 80 tu .a lmown.~

,,

• tar Plato the ldeaot the good 1. the ult1ute .oure. ot all
the ~p X ~

ot the mo_billt7 or thing. and ot their ".17

Dvm thOUGh nato mainta1ne th1a partlaula r function

t the good. namel)" tbat 1t 18 the {I outtce ot both

the obJeot.

f knowledge and tlwlr lmoWablUt:r, atlll the exact nature of

a principle 1s .ltl"lve wbenevwnato mentlona 1t.

nato

eematoto on a tenoe When he triea to esplain the .xact natw:-e

the Supreme Good.

At one point he

8a,..

.

.

tlWa1, II'f beloved,

-t-

i

let us

tL~r:J3S

fOT the t:t1"r'e bl'ling the nature of the good 'n it-

self; for it s(;ems that to attain to my prosent

SUrMtSf":

of that

i0 a pitch above tho impulse that wings my flight today.")O
Th.en again he sf11 S 1n so

~.ny

words that the idea of the

(:001

is

a s'.tr1l1is e, and vb ether I a.:n right or not, God on!.'; kno1!;"S. "31
Later on he

ln~lsta

that t he idea ot the good is "very hard to

believe -- yet tram another point of view is harder still to
deny. "32

Just how the Supreme Good is the s ouree of or the cause

of being, whether it is a creative cause or not, how it exerts
its causality on being -- these
not answer in hiD treatment
But they are problems

or

are

que.tiona that Plato does

the Supreme Good in the Republic.

that readers of the Republic have been

asking tor centuries.

The reality

or

thegood is hard to deny because, as

has been seen, Plato himself says that the good is not the same

as being, but even beyond baing and
power.

it in dignity and

Such an explanation is t he clue to the "transoendent"

natul'tl of the good • .3)
tltude.

surpa88i~~

The good is a totality. an absolute plen-

It is something more than being, it is a reality that

rises above the notion of being and 1s mora exalted by its very

)0 506:&.
31 517B.

12 5)2D.
33 Taylor, 286.
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Uttu!1oC

than bol~.34.

'rills notion of the tlbejondnoss ff and "tral'l8-

endenoe" ot the Good ia very fundamental to Platots ph1losophy
8

seen in the

!te..2:b:J.l~.

The metaphysioal con••quences ot such a

onclusion will be studied more thorouGhly 1n the tinal chapter

~

"'transcendent" nat.ure ot tbi. unique_metaphysical

r1nclple and 1te power to unlty all reality baa been a source
eontroveray 81nc. it tlrat Baw the llght ot cttY. 1'h8 controera,. can be .p1 tomtaad in a que.tloft thus.

Does th, good 1Ih lob

tranaconda all being, even the being 1n the w<rId

or

1<1eu J this

rtectlon which unite. all thing. in a perfeotion. really exist
ut.ide the mind whieh concelvea lt as tho ond of' all thlngs1

o answer this quest10n many more quest10na would have to be
IW61'ted

betore it.

Beoaua. ot the intimate,real relation be-

good and. the PlatonIc ideas, which." the obJeots
11'1 the third stage of the d.ivided. line, the

ot

SL;'VOL4 ,

a bIt hes1tant to oome to any conclu.sions.
ere 1s to La round no very olear and preciee explanation tram

lato in Which ho rnakttl!l definite k'14t1nctlon between the 1deas
Supl"eme Q'oo<1.

lIe does make .. distinction, hoftver ob-

••• by the other section or the tntelUg1ble I mean that whioh the reason 1tselt

l.,.a hold ot by the power ot dl.loctlo.,
treating it. assuaptlone not as absolute
beginnings but llterall,. as hypotheses,
underpinnings, tootinrs, and springboards
DO to apeak, to enable it to rise to trAt
wblch requires no aa:.nllaptlon tlnd 18 the
starting point 01" all, and alto%' attaining
to that! again taking hOld or the first dependeno os tl'Om it, 80 toproceod dO'Wnwax-d
to the conaluslon&, maktng no use whatever
ot ani Obj60t at: senae but only 01* pure ideas

m.ovl%~ Oll tl:wou.gh 1deal to ideu and endlnr;
w1th 1deas.»

Bow whetlutr tb1a staMina point to which all other
thinss r1ae 1s aomething radlcalll dltt6Nnt from the lde.s them••1 ve., or whether 1 t 1s just so.m.e supreme ide. rising above the

others in that it 18 the first 1de. 1n tne 10g1ea1 order tram
which all others tlo..,ls not immediately clear from the text

of Plato.

The firat princ1ple to Whioh all other 1de•• 1"1.8 1.

the 1dea ot the goodJ

or

thla thore ia 11 ttle doubt.

Connenta-

tors, YIOrk1ng tNa this text of Plato, argue well that what 1.
sa1d ot the goodwlll

i.i..,~

i,.ot,o be true 01' all the other ideaa

or hypotheses which Plato makel 80 :much 01'.

It it should be

proved tha.t the good 1s ltaelt a lelt-subsisting torm, a reality

lubatantlall,. dist1nct trom. the

tv,;;\st

or reallty, than, it would

.eem that the same would have to ba said at all the

Qtb(~t-

1df.tf.l8_-t

Here Qno can :recall wbat was 8ald previousl.,. about tbe evident

shortcomtna of the Platonic .,.atem, namel,. tha t no verT olear

30
distinction was ever made between the objects of knowledge and
the knowledge of objects.

As a result ot this contusion Platon-

ism lends itself to the interpretation that the ideas are real,
subsistant beings.

On the other hand, it 1s equally plausible

in the light of the textual interpretation ot Plato to say that
the ,Supreme Good of Plato held merely a logical supremacy in the
rea~

ot ideas while the real subsistence and existence of the

supreme Good was an idea never intended by Plato.
No att~:mpt will be made in this inquiry to prove or
to disprove the conclusions of commentators on this question.
Arguments equally as strong for both sides can be formulated
tor the problem.

But in spite of the apparent dIfficulty, many

of the unique qualities of the Supreme Good were able to be
pointed out.

Nothing seen so far in this study excludes the

possibility of the real existence of the Supreme Good, oven

though Plato himself may never have drawn that conclusion for
himself,

No real contradictory notions have been round that

would make it impossible tor such a Supreme Good to exist as a

real being outside the mind that conceivos it.

Perhaps other

philosophers would come along: in t he years and the c entur1es
atter Plato, and by making use of all his original and novel
ideas, prove the r'eal existence of such a beinE.

But t h1s 1s
-+t ..

matter for another chapter of thls thesis.

Summarily, the studj

of Plato has led to a oasle notion of the Supreme Good as a

31
unique, meta.physical principle which is the source of being tor
all things, both the objects of knowledge and of the knowledge

of objects itself -- even though in Plato's explanation thereis
not a cler and evident distinction between t he two _. and which
itself' transcends all being but yet includes the
b e1nt;.

tot~.11 ty

of all

CHAPTER III
DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE.
AS

THE -GOOD GOD"

PRESENTED IN THE B! DIVINIS NOMINIBY§

Slowly the many pages ot the history ot philosophy
tilled with tbe inspiring story of the genius, Plato, have been
turned over.

Many more pages have to be thumbed before the

chapter of history headed with the name "Dionysiu8 the Areopagite" appears.

Though the story ot his life 1s brietly told,

still his influence in the philosophical and theological

thou&~t

of the Middle Ages was greater than is commonly realized.
An interesting and yet decidedly confusing detail
about the life of the authorj Dlonysius, has pl"ovoked wide-

spread speculation.

From internal evidence, as far as is known.

the Cprpu! Areopasltum --

as

the works ot Dlonyslua are now

alled -- was composed at the end of the fifth C611tury or' at the

32
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beginning of the sixth oentury.l
~ous17

on this point.

All authorities agree unanl-

And yet this fact manlfestly contradiots

the statements that the Author himself makes about his life.

He

seems, for instance, to SA1 that he was present at the i'uneral
services of the Blessed Virgin Mar7, and that at the bUl'lal he
had talked with the Apostles James and Peter. 2

Besides 'this,. he

1 1. Godet, "Denys l.Ar~opaglte," Dictlonnalre de Th~oloele
C.th:0ll~,e" ed_,:by A. Vacant and"
'Mapgeno'E,-':1Dralre
t.~ousey at Ana, PariS, 1933, 4, col. 431.

r.

2

D1on,-slus the Areopagite, De

Dlv1n1'''llominlbUs~

tl'-ans1. b,.

Balthasar Corderius, ad. by P. IIgne, pa~{s,·! 51, II! 2.
Both the Latin and the Greek, when t he author thinks t is
necessary rO:t~ a better underntanding o£ the text, will be
taken from the Jl!lgne edition.

Some just1tlcatlon should be

gi van for t he use of the Latin rathol:' thanthe Greek.; the
original language ot Dionysius. In the first place, the
remote interest ot this paper in the author, D1onysius, lies
in the tact at his influence in the west. This intluence
was through a Latin medium rather than through the Greek
text. We are ooptain of this because ot the great popularity of the ma.ny cOlnmentaries on his works &luong the Latins.
Secondly, from all extant historical accounts on the point,
Dionysius' principle int'luence seems to be in t he West rather
than in the East. "Pa8udo-Dionysius the Areopagite can be
included among the ear1,- Western masters by reason of the
wide circulation of his writings and t heir influence upon
the Latin world ••• He thus became a western by adoption."
Hauriee de Wulf, Histor~ ot Mediaeval Phl1osoRhZ, Longmans,
Green aDd Co., Lonaon, 9~1 lbl. "Thei werG popularised
b1 the Latin versions of Hi duin and Scotus F~rigena in the
ninth centur1. ~ld had a oonsiderable influenc~ in the
Middle Ages, which put them in t he forefront of the Apostolic writ1ngs." Cayre, 91. Therefore, it can be said that
it was the Latin rather than the Greek text of Dionysius
tha.t made hi:::. a philosopher and a theologian of'- ~T~''''A.
~'N'S 0 \''\I/>~~
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protesses to be Saint Paults Athenian convert, Dionysiu8 the Areopaglte.
The Mediaevals, from all appearances, accepted the
statements and allusions ot Dlonyslus at their fece value, Ilnd
~orthe

most part, were unaware of the anachron1.s:ms.

Only later

IBhrewd scholarship bega.n to see the d.iscropancy between the ex~lic1t

atatements ot the author and

actual historical facts

t~e

ot his 11fe. The considerable weight of such &nnchronians on
rixing the t!me for the writings of the warlee has led to tho sub-

"equant name of Dlon'181u9, the author of the
do-Dlonyslus" or the "pseudo-Areopaglte."

'IN

orks, a.s the "pseu-

Often he is listed

LUlder t he name of "Denys," the French form of Dlonysius, and is
~bu8

contused with the apostle and tirst bishop of Parls, Sa1nt

penys the Martyr.
Great scholars have been trying for a lone time to

solve the mystery of pseudo-Dionysius. Their attempts do not
.eem to have been very successful. J From internal evidence
~uthori ties

1 ved at

tr~

all agree that t he author ot the Cor"eus
end of the

lixth century.

r Ittb

century

01"

at tho

Dl".lSt

have

ber:~.nni:·!r;

of the

With suoh compelling evldanoe, it is di!flcult

,"0

explain Dionys1us's Dissitnulatlon.

This snould not, howevor,

~

For a comprehensive study of this point see the Dlctionnaire
2. Theolof.ji.e Cethollg.ue, h3l-1~.32.
'

lessen our estimation of the \1orks. We may,
and .th the authority of

~£ny

qlJ.i te lOf~ltimntoly

great scholars, consider the Areo-

pagite's dissimulation as literary fiction; such a practice in
his day was not only entirely permitted but was even considered
Dionyslus, most likely, thought that writin~; with

laudable.4

authority was the best means he could use to answer the problems
that taxed the minds of thinkers of his day.

His works have

great intrinsic value; on this score most ot all we should judge
their merit.
Dionysius was mentioned as an authority for the first
time in the religious conferences a t Constantinople duri'1€': the
early part of the sixth century.

Here his works wore quoted as

apostolic by the Severlan Monophysitas in defense of their peculiar J..ionophysite doctrines.

"The very first citations of his

works that one finds were made Ly the monophys1te, Severus, patriarch of Antioch. at the Council ot: Tyre, whlch could not have
been later than t he year .513 ... 5

Though the Catholics rejeoted

thec;e wri tinga as probably apocryphal, t he

Vi

arks of Dionys1us

loon won the recognition ot all great scholars.

The influence

they exerted was due chiefly to great wrlters of the time who

~

~
'"

C .E.Rolt, Dionlsius the Areopagi te, btacill11ian Co., New York,
1920 2
- -

ttLel • premieres
• ~
. ~itatlons
.
quton en trouve,' sont faitee par Ie
monophysita stvo~e, patriarched l Antloche, dans un'concilc de
Tyr qui ne pout etre posterieur a l'an 513." Godet, 431.

L

quoted them with ':rJ.thOl"i ty. (;

In sp1te of the tact that there was a contradiction
between the lite and the words of the author, all his writings
continued to have considerable influence.

This influence wns

due chiefly to the commentary on the works of Dlonysius written
by Max1mus Contessor.

The translator's own works had already

been accepted as orthodox; this added to the favorable interpretation of the works of D1onysius.

In the year 757 Pope Paul sent

the Greek text of Dlonysiu.s l works to the Gallican Church.

For

almost a whole century they lay untouched, a hidden trea.sure, in
the Abbey of Saint Denis. 7 Finally, the eentulry' old <i.ust was
brushed off the volmr.es, and Hilduin, the Abbot of the monastery,
with t he aid of a few collaborators, translated t,he

pseudo-Dlonyslus.

YfOJ::>lrs

of

Only a fow years latel'O John Scotue F:r1gena,

at the l"Oquest of Charles the Bald, began h15 Latin translation
01" the Cor~us.8

Through the translations of Brieena, D10nyslue

became the chief exponent

0;£

tho Greek trad1tion of the indirect

Platonic influence upon Christian thiruting.

'rho erfects of this

translation were felt considerably durine the Middle Ages, even

6 Cayre. 91.
7 W.J. Sparrow-Simpson" "lJ..'he Influence of Dionysius in Relig10us
HlstOlT. It D10nls1ua the'
Macmillan Co., New' 'YOrIC,
8 De Wult, 68.

Af92§QRite,

. , 0263.

transl. by E.E.Rolt ..
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than

001'8

YI8

o:xpec t. 9

Soholal'S began looldng to D1onysluo as the

"culmen o£ Flaton1am."lO
It 18 not surpr131nJ. therefore, that some

or

tho

great men ot the !l1ddle Aeea wrote commentaries on tho wor-ks.

Men like Hugh ot Saint Victor, saint Albert,and Sa1nt Bonaventure
turt.hol' onhanced the influence

oommentarios on his works.11

or

Dionyaius by their extens 1 va

Saint Thomas htmselt not only

quotes D10nyslus qu1to frequently but also wrote a commentary on
the

l2! pi v~pl.

l~lp.lbu8..

it 1s evident that tho naza
groat

!~Gn

as it 1e tada)".

and my_ticnl, liturgists a.nd

In t he light ot this histOl'ioal data,

Qr

Dlon".1ua was then not unknown to

ftAt that tltte, th~oloSlQ:rllJ, asoetic.
Ell

yen artisto, found insp1rat1on in

the works ot the '<Areopaglte.,.,12
The Corea jl.rG,oaa&i t1c!5! which 18 extant contains tour

treatIses and ten lettere.
the

1?!. 01 vin1.a,

or

the four treat1ses, two of them.,

tiom1,R1 bUlB. and also the Mzst1ca f..h601ros1~, are

concerned wIth God and the knowledge of God.

The other two,

egeleratia 1l1erarphla and ;Soolosias,Plca p,lerarohla, deal with the

twofold hierarchy_
•

•

r

p,

r ,

••

Thea.,grks are entlre17 tree trom and avoid

any controversial spirit in the rnnnnerot presentation of the

This 1s the a uthor'. deliberate intent aa lsseen so

doctrine.
otten

in the works themselves.

He was not interested in re-

fut1ng the Greoks, hI. intentions were to expound the Christian
philosophy .,Dd theology in the light of the p'hl1oeophy and theolog;t h{J) had learned i'rom the Greeks.

lIe seemed tOlBnt to show

h18 reader. that the rnere tact ot proving scnothlng •• wrong did

not estahlish hie own vicwa aa tr'"y.e.13
D10nyaius usos his "arks .s a

we can get to know ('rod.
who God is.

He then

GOOli

flllU\1'lC

or showing us bow

on to tall

U.3

how \"Ie learn

In hls writings he seaos to .atab11ah throo ciistinct

\>.,aya in whl011 the human mind can arr!. vo at the knowladco

!Jf'

God •

.£<'lrst of all Dlonys1us tells us that God 1s "'0).11 ~Vtl,l.(.OS' the Ood

n.

of many names.

_ays this because atLl tho.. th1nss that tht3

hunlan mind knows and the things that the senaes of man br1ng in-

to the scope of his consc1ousness, all are .e

tiona ot God.

What uan be 8!l1d of inferiors

80

mAn7 manif •• ta-

can also be said of

the .Iuperlor nature that 1s the cau.e at the 1nr.rl()l''''8.11~
explanat10n

of: th1~

The

-

point 1s the t atal t heme of the De D1 vln1a
,

Nondnlbua. Becau•• In this way all the perf'ectlons that are

$

J

I

t I'

11.

found in tr18 Cl'cuiturcu are affirmed ot their first CaURG, their

c:reatoz,; th1. way of

.... I

"'

r

1

it

m

* .,.

arrll~at1on

18 called the

Yla

A.t,r.1'1'"'f!1:p..t.f.pni~s •

And yet 1. t i.e

Ql.li te

evident, Dionye1.us affirms, that these names

can be equally denied a.1: the first cause because it 1s so trans-

cendent by nat'u'Eh

The first cause, so superior to all second";'

ary causes and to all creatures, must have perfections that are
far superior to these.

'!'here f' are , all the names th.at are ["1 ven

thll first cause as the cause

at all beings can also be denied of

that first cause on the grounds of its transcendent nature.

This

denial of nem as in the f lrst cause ot all being 1s the bas is of
the .y!! NeGationi.s.
this.

Dut we must be very c8.1'eful when we so.y

This denial 0:J.' names does aot get us ultimately to an in-

determination as so .J1any philosophe.l."s, sncient as wall as modarn,
have been led to conclude.

Rathel' it leads to a tr'anscendent

nature that contains all these perfections in a manne.!' .car superior to the way in which these perfections are found in the inferiors.

11'01'"

this reason our knowledge of the first cause does

not stop at negations.

Atter we have denied the perfections as

found in inferior beings to the first cause, we then
a higher step.

~)o

up to

The knowledge of the first cause ends finally in

the affirma.tion of the super-nature of the first CCiuse.

'1'1'1is

way of knowing :finally the super-nature of t he first detel"mining ca . . . . se of all tlllngs is called ·the Via Exccllentla~.15

last two ways oj: knowing God are

tloeated by Dlonysiu.s

!1stiea ?he,?lofJ.a. J.vt:n though this

15 ~ Dlvlnip. Nominl~u3, 1,1.

thr(H,j~'old

These

in the

division i8 not so

clearly outlined as this 1n the writings ot Dlotl,.81u.j however,
the basi. of the divIsion 18 certaInlr evident in all his work ••

The interest ot thi8 paper lie8 first and foremost in
the

!!! :!l:r&rstfoAl.•. t

throughout the .p.!. D1 vlp.l~ N~mlp,lbUJ!. thII

attll"matl ve .ay 18 moat frequent17 m.a:-kod bY' the use ot the wOrda
d.~r~ Ol'~ex'-.

The significance

in • tew moment..

or

theS8 _we•• iona '11'111 be aeoft

Firat ot aU Will be stud1ed the stages

or

knowledse through wh1ch t he soul goes bet ore comine; to the high-

knowledge, th.e knowledee otthe cause ot all things.

.8 t

Then

w111 be ••en the various attributes the soul ar£lrms of this

high.st eauae and also how It does th1s. .Finally, the highest
Pl"&,:1ic,te at this. a tinal cause wl11 be analrzed.

The soul, DdOD1Siu8 goes on to show, bas a threefold
activIty or motion

or

knowledge.

ward

(It~V""£s).

Th••• DlOtlons are the three stag ••

In the low.st .tage the soul move. straight tore-

(K~r' f~g£14V).

In thia motion it doea not turn within tt-

.elf but turns,outward upon all the things around it and experiences the influence at the wOl"ldall around 1 tSf)lt •

"Sed ad a.

quae ipsl vicina aunt progreditur."16 The activit,. oenters
around. tb1nga

'.

Em

....

~,

,Wv ~

3'-'! • This

activit,. never ria •• above a

knowledge or the material, tana!ble thing. prattered the soul
through t be use at the seneea b1 the '\'tWld outside it.

This ao-

tlv1t,'

or

the soul. can b. called the .phere

or

sensation.

A ,edond motion, at upwe.rd and spiral motion

(iAt KO-

l(~s) takes plaoe when t he soul 1. enlightened 'by great truths

1n a prooess of discursive reaaon1ns (ttcog1tando et dlaourrendott ).
When the aoul acta thua it mIk es uae of knowledge drawn trom the

precedlns act1vlty but gOe8 on to more universal oonclusions.
"Oblique vero oletux' animus, quando pro captu

1U0

notlonlbua

d1v1ni. 111uatratur, non sp1rltal! quldem unite modo, sed cogit.
sndo et dlscurrendo quasi permiatla tluxlsquo actlan1bus. tt17
Flanll,. the soul moves ln

fa

c1rcular motlon b~VI(~LK~}
)

,

when it tUl'n8 away trom all things that 11e out.ide It.elf (<<7TO
~ "~
TWV
L~"')

and oenters lta attentlonon the things that ooeuP7 and

are oentered in it. own mind.

It ooncentrates on 1ts own powera

and oomes tlnall,. to the principle that gives un1ty to all tb1ngS4
This principle af uni t'1 11 t he O'ood whlch i& beyond. all things.
It 1s one and ls the same. without beg1nning and w1 thout end.
•

(

~"

r D VTTte 7Tdv"rtJ,.
I

•

~I

..

4-'

..,

T.< ovrtiL,l(t!I,l. ev /(elt

. ,

t"'ctVl'DY, /(iIlL

I

tl(Y.{f~otl'

The highest and most perfeet activIty

tUt:I71:'OV.)

ot

, "

Kttll

the

;;~oul

18 the oontemplation and t be mental aotivlt)" oentered a:bout the
Good, the Beautiful, the One, all ldent1t1 •• in the f1nal prinC1ple.

Once

tm.

80ul hal reached, this h1ghtust and moat perfEH3t

activit,-. once it concentrates on the Good u tho highest prin-

-

".

17 IV, 9.

)

••

J

.( rEA-

oiplo of all things, there can be no greater actlvlt7 poss1ble

tor the IOul.

Therefore, in the language ot Plato, the 80ul haa

reached its "~f£r~."la
lior i8 1 t mere aecldent that the soul comea finall,. to
the knowlodge

or

tho Good.

All thinss are grounded In the Good,

trom it all things bava rece1ved the1r being, have received all

that

t

hey are, tUld b'1 it they art.. being constantl,. preserved in

their 'being.

"Qu1n ot earum flrm1taa hIno, at stabili tas at con-

servatl0, bonorumque pabulum pendet. n19 Not onlr do they retain
their own Id.entlt7 veoause

or

tho Good, but all th1ngs are what

they are because ot the Good.
their ve1'7 being

t'ttOltl

'the,. receive, in other' words,

the Good.

Now this 18 true

even ot loula and ot the aotivities ot the souls.

or

all thing.,

ftAnlmae quoque

ac qua.1ibet an~ bona aunt per bonltatem 1110 (J,d..

rnv ~1Ttf

~!~No~), quae omne bouu. superat, tnde provenlt, il108 1nte1leotu

praed1t.a ease, vttam habere 8ubatantlalem, corruption!. expert. .,
ut 8a.. hal)oant OUlll angell. oonllN.ne. ,,20 Prom t he Good and becaw.se

ot the Good all thing. have be1ng and reta1n their respect1 ••
tt.,.,

luGing

( :t

£1<

,

...

r4l(YDL 80 a) and

(".,

A

0'.( rtllL'~pov

)

•

Beoau•• of this tact a 1 1

thing. manltolft the Good in themsalve., by the very tact that the,.

oa~erul to dlst1ngu1abbeoau.e Dionyslu8 does between the word "Junl° (vOv~) UJled to d•• ignate angola, .. nd .
'hn1mu.tt (tI'lIX"';) uaed' to designate the rational poftra or man,
and tn a wl~.r sinse, the vital principle or ~.
1n1F AOJ\1n1pup, IV. 1.

18 We must be

~Z

¥V,Pi:

exist and are what they are, they point to and proclaim t be ex-

istence ot the Good, whioh ia the cause ot their very being.

"Ipsamet tor.ma bonltatl. ipsi. data .at, conceaaumque, ot ut
latentem ~ a. bonitatem val. ant enuntlare. u21 Tbua t~b
oreated thIngs the soul riaes to the knowledge ot • cauae that
,

must ex1st trom t be ver"1 tact that all things exist ... Z-L
~~""'"

't'OV

U£DV

erro

/C"Cl.tr~W5

I

KtJf".LI.OlJ

~
ro,s

,

17oL",.u.-'''''

,

V"OV~EV',",

,

I

"''' pct.~ cL

XtI(

8-

0f~rllL' .u22 Thus In tIle mind of Diony'slu8 the efficIent creative and 8uatainlne cause of all th1n£a waa identlfied with the
final go.. ot the soul t • knowledge becausc the funct10n of each

ot theae causos taken

tled in ono and the

1ndlv1dua~17

8amB

bad ultimately to be identl.

cause.

We bave .een how tbings reoeive their very being trom
the fIrst caus., the first prinoiple

or

all thlngs.

Now it 1.

equall,. true to la1 t hat all things a1m a t the Good u theIr
laat end

a t tho pertection of thelr being.

01"

The good tor each

indl vldual be1ng 1. satheXted up in the t otali tr ot the Good because the good as the cause of all t hlnss l3'.\\lat al:read'1 contain
the pertectlon of' all beings to whioh it 1s goIng to first glve
that perfection.

All thinss strive tor the perfectlon at theIr

beins, th1s 1$ thelr pI'opel" end and 1& round In the tlnal cause,
the Good..

Beoau••

thalr tinal end.
....

1t'

r

II

'''"'

ot this all th1ll€s

8t1"1V6

tor t he Good u tor

"Bonumque illud est ex quo omnia constiterunt

44
at velut1 a perfectis81ma causa producta aunt, at in qua consistunt un1 versa ••• et ad quod omnia, ta.'nQ,uam ad .finem q.J.aeque suum.

convertuntur, quodque appetunt uni versa •.,,23
Dionyslue goes on to saytbat a process to lnfinltl

1n explaining participation is tapoes1ble by the very nature of
beings which are finite.

,'We must como, finally, to the Oood

whieh is good not because ot participation but by its vcr., essence
~nd

bonus cst Deus, ut tam.qWlWl
substantiale bonum, bonltatem 1n omnia porrigat. K24 The Good~
be1ne;.

"Et sic quia o£ulent1.

·1IUa

then, pours ita goodness on all beings and then draws all thinss

to itself bytbe vet!1 tact that it ls £ioodne88 by lts very nature.

Deoaus. of the tact

thtlt

it i . the Oood that gtves being to all

things and (11"""$ all things to itselt .s their tinal end, the

Good i8 the principle and primal cause ot all things.
Atque ut omnia bonita. ad Be convertit,
pr1maque, Quae disperse aunt, colliglt,
tamquam uniflea dlv1nltas et principium
unitatis, omniaque lp.~ at prlnolplum, ut
cc>mplexum, ut f'ltlem o.ppetunt; bonumque '1llud
eBt (ut Scrlptyra saora testatur) ex quo omnia
constlterunt. 2 >

Were there anything beJ'Ond the Good 1n the order of oausee, theretore, that oause and not tbe Good, wuld be the end to which all
things w~ld aspire. aD
•

all
01'

th1~:;s

aspire, l:ta.$ far treater 1m.po%·tnnc0 1n the phIlosophy

DioXlyci'..l.s than 1s at .fir!Jt evident.

The v 6l"Y .fact that Dian,.-

stu8 t attention \'roO oonte;-ed on tho c&use of all. t;r.lings (<<i -rL-.
71"cI("rwv) and the end 01" all t hinge (Z"e).o~

""''''';;;11')

expla1ns

wb7

Coodness because ot Whi:.t 1t 18 booamo the very foundatlon of his

philosophical systom.

Upon the 1dea ot the Good depended the

ram1t1catj.on ot hi. sYltem of' ph11oaophy.27

So fundamental as thin idea of

th~ OOO',i

.for Dlonys1us

that within tho scope or its extension 181 not only being but

non-baing An well.

"S1quid.em nomen boni de neo declarat omnes

emanation.a auotorla omnlum, et porr161tur Mec naminatic Del

a bono tum ad ea quae aunt, tum ad ea quae non sunt, estque aupel'l
0& quae sunt, tit super eB quae non aunt. ,,28

above being because both baing and
of 1 t.

The Good, then, 11ea

~bc1ng Ql~

pnrtlo1patlo%l$

.o1onyslus quite emphatlcall,. states that non.. be1ng is as

muoh a partioipation

stand his meaning_

or tho

Good a8

bolUS, lest anyone f.l1sundor-

Be expressos tlus ldea

~1te

cogently whon
, ,:I'

he w:rites: ·'Audebo etlam hoc dioere, 1d q,uod non est

pulohrum .t bonum partleipare. rt29

(r~ MI1 "vo),

If the Good already contains

both the good. and. the be1ng ot all things, and bualdes oontains

'-'I

L:rifn~ ciarli~' and Ruddle. k, Jl. !I1.t~rl gE.. Phl1ca0Ez. F. S.

Crotts • Oat, K•• York, 19~1J ~.
28 De Vlvin!. Nomlnlbu8, V, 1.
29 -rv,· 1.'
t

I

I

·

.

. . ./;,.1

There 1s reaaon to wonder how Dlon1s1u& explains the
way in which non.... ouinD, participates 1nthe Cood.

Tbe explanation

f;iven is q.ulte simple; it 1s easy to see how D10019iu8 was for-

ced to draw this conclusion 1n the 11"'bt
of the root of his
b
pbl10tlopby.
,.£(11,

"0" ) ,.

lie explains 1 t thus:

1111uIl quod tNpra

'luiu stierJ. in bono

,

(

• .,

,

1'08

111!'.iWi

quod non

6iit

(rD

omnea est, bonl iIe51,doria tenatut·,

i\ .....

r-<y" "'~)

ffIllud

VGl'E>

supl;JrDubstantial1

pel'

o::.m1um

u.~latlonol:l1 ot'lse cont(;lnd!t.n ,30 l"rol:J thin ntat4~mel'lt we conclude

(,!!e.sldorJ...o,) for the Good.

B'1 its vor;r naturo non-being could

not partlel;?ate 1n 1:"01118; It 1s directly opposed to b cirli:.

Dlonysiu8 art1rt'\8, 1. t cttn ahll or atr1 ve

fOlll

Yet,

the Good becausf'1, it

can atr! va for the partioular good that 1 t can have and yet does
not have.

Dlo117s1us g1v€le

1..18

anothex· clue to the nature of non-

being wben 11(, goes on to say. f't1)es1det"st cn1m 111ud otlam ld

quod non OKs1stlt, ut diotum ost, ot al1quo modo in ipso esse
contend1 t, quoniam IpSUD1 est quod formam rebus fonna carentlbu8
tr1bult, at in ipso otlam ld qu()d non est, supra el:UlEmt1am die!-

tur, ot oflt.- 31

From this quotation it can be

8

aid that D10n1-

sit.:.s consldeps the Good

thvt

Non-beinp~,

C08S

not havo 1'o::'''m..

~ims

at or has a desire

poed.

HS

to

t}la~~

which

which ar; yet does not have form,

r or the r orm

whi eh it can have f rom the

This stri vine: for or d(.;sire for a form make8 of non-being

participation of the Good.

11

w~lich CtV(~B fornl

Non-being is that wt.l.ich is form-

iless but still has a desiro for t he Good.

Therefore, the parti-

cipation in the Good extends to being as well as to non-being, to
Ithe. t which has form as well as to that which lacks form.

The

lood, therefore, atanding above both being and non-being, has the

oighest position, the primacy, in the ontological order.
~t

From

proceed by participation all being and all non-being.
When Dlonyslus uses the word non-being, he means one

,r

these three things.

First of all, he could be refer:r>ing to

l"he non-being of Cod, whtch he often "r:akos montion of whon he
~peaks

of the

~v1dent

~ith

Neeiationla.

it-om the context.

)f evtl.
~xists

lli

This restricted use is always very

Zecondly. it can refer to the non-being

Evil a.s evil cannot exist on the plane of being; it

.... if this 'Word

CDn

be useEl when speaking c£ evil - .. only

an affinity w1th the Good.

Evil Slue. ev11 neither has nor

'onf'ers being, and is neither cood nor cor..i'81"s cood.
nalum neque est neque bonum est. tt.32

2

IV, 20.

It is only

ttlpsum e:nim

boca'~ae

of 1 ts

affInity with a good that evil can be said to be positive and
produotive at all.

place

or

f!hen non-being, therefore, i8 uaed in the

ev11, it 1s 4sed 1n a 8ens6, strictl,. speaking, even

lower than non-being

b~cause,

whereas non-belng pal'tlcipatss 1n

the Oood and desires tho Good as ita end, evil noither part!-

.

elpatea 1n t he Good nor d eslres an end, and 1s alwa18 admix. .
Whe~e

with being.

the i8 "no being" th.re 18 no evil.

absolute non-existenoe.

Evil 18

"Malum. autem nee 1n el. q\.u.te sunt, nee

1n ela quae non aunt, sod eo et1am non est, remotlu8 est a bono:3~
Therefore, tbe term non-beiuf:, 1s used ot evil onlT in a very
broad sense.

For all practical purposes, this idea ot the non-

being ot ev11 has tor Dlonlsiua the same meaning I.e "privation
has tor later philosophers.

Howver, »101l781u8 never makes us.

ot that word.
More p1"Operl,. non-heine; 1'81'er8 to matter which i8 the

formless .tutt that ••• ka or haa a )"8aMlng for a
GOod. J4

rON

In Tor,. simple tams Dionyalu8 argues in this

t&r 18 t bat whioh 18 formless and eeeks a torm_

18 tormless 1s

no~bt1ng.

in the

"7-

Mat-

But that 'II11ch

Therefore, matter 11 non-being.

Saint Thoma. explains quite well how Dlon181u8 oomes

~.l IV, 19.
34 IV, 18.
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to thls concluslon.35

Dlon7s1ua talls to dIst1nguish between a

prl vat10n and what he moans by mattel".

comes a

non-~,~,

Consequently, matter be-

which participate. in t he Good in so tar as 1 t

seeks its forma.tlon in the Oood.

By its very nattU'o it (loss not

aeek participatIon in !n! boeause "nihil ante appetlt nIsI slbl
s1ml1ot fl36

Since ma.ttor 1s a non-being, it cannot seek the In-

formation ot beins. which 1. ita oppos1te.

No'll

the obvious con-

clusion tor Dlo%l7alus to draw trom thIs thesis 1s th.at the oxtension at the Good 18 greater

tt~nUle

extension ot being.

We can look upon thIs 1nterpretation in another light.
In the 8,.atem of Dion7s1u8 lt 18 not in the 11ne of predication
but in the line ot causalit1 that the Good extends ltself both
to being

and to non-being.J7 Oonsequently, our notion

or

nan-

being does not mean simply that whlch doea not exist -- "non
ea simpliciter quae penitus non sunt,,,3 8 _. but. instead, that
.hlah 18 in potency and u

yot not in aot.

But 1t 18 neoes8tU7

to make the d1at1nctlon that D1onyalu8 was OQNtul to y:-.ako.

The

potenc7 which 1s non-being in this systom. 1$ in patane,. to tho

act whioh
•

• , 1

•

I

OL'"l

be g1ven it by the o.ood alone, it 1s not in potency
• • • TU

Corderll," S. DI0~.11

!l1gne, parta, I13S~ ~8.

So
to t he act wh;tch 18 alreadY' :rea11.ed.

or

t.rheretore, tho potency

non.-belng, as far as Dlon:ra1uD 1$ concerned, doen not

&1...'1'11

at

or str! ve for the act contained. in being but tor the a ct con'rhe Good. then, 1n so tel'" as 1. t bnpllea the

tained 1n tbe Good.

notion or final cause, draws to itself both tbat which 1s 1n act

aa woll as thAt which ls 1n potenc,.."

1n aot has form.

Then again, that whioh la

It has already been seen how Dloo,)"slue znakes

on the other band, that whIch 1s

that whlch has form, be1ng.

formless 18 what 18 1n potencY' to act. tor D100781u8 thi8 Is the

fundamental meaning ot non-belng.
and non-boinS. the formed and the

strive tor

L~

Summaril,., then, both being
formless, act and potency,

aim at the Good aa theIr own particular good.

As

such the Oood 1s t he ;fundamental ontological principle and ulti-

mate goal of all things.

All bas been aeen
c1ted rrom the

Wl"lt111{~s

rrom

the VArious quotat.1oll$ alread,.

ot Dlon:yslua,

cal system i8 ident1f1od w1.th the God

t

be Good in his philosophi-

or his theological alatem.

All that haa been said of the Oood 18 to be SQid

the two are reall,. identioal.

-<:,6(6'0".)039

or

God beoause

"Quia a1e easent1a sua bonue Gat

Deul, ut tamquam su.batan tiale bOllUll (~r' ,;;,

~u ..,wJf.~

•

What haa been •• d

,1v6(,

r~ :t!d.Btfv, ~s

ot the d~.,d 13 ,lR80

tacto true ot God because the Good 18 that whlch pours out 1ta
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goodness by participation on all things. while it itself does
not participate in goodness but is goodness 1 tself..
exactly what 1s meant by the word God.

This is

Every good that 1s not

1ts own goodness is good by participation.

But God, bein[ the

source of all things cannot and does not participate either in
goodness or in anything else.

By His very nature He is [oodnessltO

So too, the Good is perfect goodness; it does not participate in
goodness but is goodness by its very nature.

Therefore, Dion,..

sius identities the words God and Good, wluchare identical in
reality.

Because the Good is the summit of perfection and be-

cause the Good is identified with God, Dionysius concludes that
the highest name of God is "the Good."

"Ae primum perfectum at

quod omnes Dei emanationes manifestat. boni nomen expendamus."41
lFor this reason we can readily see why Dionyslus uses the two
lWords interchangeably throughout his entire work.
In the light of the lmowledge of the Good, it is easy

to see why Dlonysius insists that the "He who is" of Scripturo
must be applied 1n a very special way to God.42
dicated of God in e. causal and partieipatln9' way_

Eeinr: 1s preOod embraces

all being and produces all bein!j in the very sa.roe sense that the
Good Eives being to all t:-lings.

God is not beine: inthe strict

lense any more than the Good 1s being.

But being is the first
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participation of the Good; for this reason t he Good 1s said to
be being.

So also being is thef1rst participation

ot God.

Therefore, God is said to be being in so ta.r as being is !Hs
first participatlon.

"Deus enim non quov1s modo est ena, sed

slmplicitel" €It ini'ini te in se pariter complexus at e.nticipans. n43
But then again he says:

"Primum igitur donum pEtl'

.llh.J

£Ie 1110. supraquam (slc) bonitas producat merlto ab

t1SSt1

cum pt11'

antiqulo~e

at

pr1ma omnium particlpa.tionum. laudatur, et est ex ipsa at in ipsa
Ipsum. per

86 €I

8se,"44

God is being In the senae that being is

the first participatlon at Hia divine nature.
Strictly speaking, just as God 1s not being,
80 aleo being is not God, it is only the
flrst of all the participations ot God, and
as it was just said. t ~5condition of all the
other (participations).4
The importance ot this conclusion 1s not im:lsdiately
evident.

Exe:r.1inatlon ot: the doctrine leads to the c one Ius ion

that Dlonyslus has a scale ot: being starting with

pp~

!! being,

which ls absolute being and t he first pal'tt1clpatlon of the Good,
then uni versAl being, which is the b einr: found 1n the vf.l.l"ious
modes of' participation (e.g., the mode ot: being' that is found
in all rational beings, in anirJ'lu1 lifo, or in pl;ant life), and

-

~
I:
~

V; h..
V,

~A

6.

A

"

properment parler, do mama que Dleu nte~t pas l'etrs, l'
etre n'est pas Dieu;
il n'est que 1& primiere
de toutes les
,
A
participations Iii Dieu, (:1 t comme il vient d'etl'S dit, 1& condition de toutes les autres." Gl1son,

84.
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tinally the being that is found in a particular being (e.g., in
this particular man, or animal, or plant).46 Nor is this scale
limited to the participation 01' being alone.

The very same

modes of participation are equally epplicable to th6

VB.l"'loL~s

grees of llfe, wisdom, intelligence, light, truth, power,

de-

J'l~tice,

and all t he other qualities wherein all creatur&s t;Uit participate, finally, in being also. partlcipate. 47

Each of these

scales of participation has a definite place in the hierarchy
which culminates in and ramifies

fl~Ol1l.

the Good,

Deco.use the mest universal of all the pa.rticipations
is being, it is considered the first paI'tlcipation that procedes
from the Good.

The more univers5),l

thf'l extension

of a particular

participation, the hieber it is in the scale of participation.
The importance ot this scale of partiCipation for
Dionysius is this.
the

fi~st

be the

He has to conclude that because being is

in the scale of participations, for that

fi~st

and the most

allo with all the

othe~

impo~tant

~eason

it must

name given to the Good.

part1cipations.

So

Each can be predicated

of the Good, and therefore of God, because it is a mode of partiCipation.

The importance of each of these 1s proportioned to its

place in the scale

or

participation.

-

~1 Corder'iuB, 958.

'+-

l2!.f?!2.~

;.t:orrrtni,pu8, V, :5.

That is why it can be said

that all thinGs form a definite pattern of participation that
leads to the knowledge of the Good.
"theoPhany.,,48

All nature 1s a definlte

Dionysius compares this ramifIed participatlonJf the
Good to the sun shini.ng down on all creatures.

Just as tho sun

by its very nature pours out its light on all t.lngs, so also

the Good pours out the rays 01' its goodness upon all things.

Quemadmodum enim sol ll1e noster non
cogitatione aut vo1untate, sed eo ipso
quod est, llluminat universe quae quoquo
modo lucis ejus aunt capacia; sic enlm
ipsum boaum Ipsamet substantIa sua, rebus
omnibus, pro cujusque captu, toLlus bonitatis suae radios affundit.~9
This compar1son, so very typIcal of NeoplatonI0 philosophy,50 reveals that the "b~te noir" of Platonism, that a higher power in
the hierarchy of partIcipation

t~al'sm:!. ts

power to

and

influencos

directly a lower power, has teen incorporated into the philosophy
of

Dionysius.

It Dlonysius really held this doc trine, it would

mean tha.t he believed that a 11 v1nG beine, for example, would be
ablo to pass on life to another by its own power without the dir-

ect influence and causality of the Good. 51

Yet this is true only

if D10nyslus subscribed to all thB consequences of the comparison

he used.

We do know that he usce3d t he comparison) 1 t is not evl-

-

ttB~l

Gilson, 82.

De .Pi vinls Nom1nibus.. IV, -1.
!;lal""tl.n; Clarli, and Hudd1ek, 264.
51 Gilson, 82.
~
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dent 1:rmtedlately whother h", was willing to ailiuit all tho

quonces

0:

this comparison.

C0l188-

Eecauss tho comparison was apropos

to the Idoas he was explaining, he made use of it.
mearJ.t no m.ore to hl111 than jus t that.

It l1lQy have

'rho cOfnpariaon su.r!l.lul'izes

qu.ite well his ideas .. but should be taken, from all appeur-tt:1<;'cu,
only as a co:tnpaz.'1soIi.

It is upon this idoa that the entlre sy-stetl
of Dlonysius f phllosophy really l'estz. To
u.se a figure" this idea. establishes the framework of his philosophy; at th<,summit of the
whole world ls God, 'IV ho can be 1magined as an
immense nourco of lifht, and even aathe light
itself; and from thl~ bl~zing tire radiate
cOLtntless I'ays, q\dte distinct, but harl'¥lon....
iOlls, wld with a hierarchical pattern, and
the ~·jO:i.'':~ b.rilllant mid ;:;crf'E:ct .as they ~et
closer to their uncroated source; this em~
at1.on or th(. lI::!lt :.. . e.d.:l.o.tlng fl"O::.u God -- an
etfect ot the dIvIne goodness -- ditfuses itsel!' Yllthout Intor~:'1.1.ptlon down to tho vc:'y
last degree ot the hierarchy ot·laings. In
ow:' ret.urn movement Vie arc able. as ','Ie clLllb
step b7 step, to reach the very wellspring
of Ol.~r ueine:;, OUI' first principle. 52
Yet daspi te the fact

t~-,at

£:;0 l[,u,;.h

vi'

hur~n

knowledgo indicates

I
Ctest sur cetta 1dee
que repose en reallte, toute la phl1osophie D:1onysi~)nne, q ....c en determine pour a1nsi dire, Ie
cadreJ au sommet du , monde il y a Diau, concu
comma una 1~
A
;:;,unac foyer de lu.rdel~o, ,COm.:;10 la lum1ere 11Cl'llej de ct'; foyer
jnl11lt u..rye r!'ll1tlpl1clte de rayons dlstincts, mals ha.r-monis6s, hi6rarchis&s, d'autant plus brillants at plus pal~
f~its quIlls sa rapprochent de leur source tncre~e; c.otta
eme.nation -partir de Dleu -- de le. l\IDl~.ere arfet do Ie.
bont6, divine, ze
propage sans
interrupt10n jusqu'au de~nier
./
A
deere de 1a hierarchle des etres. ot clans notre mouvement de
/
~
I'cto'.lI', nOl.1.S pouvons. en noua e10vant
d.s degre" en dee:;re;
l~onontel' j'lSqu t a notre stlurce et notre prine ipe." Thery,
"

a

II

l03-10~;.

L

!

i
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tho exIstence of the Oood... and desp! te the :i'act that orea.tures

or

manifest the nature

the Good, D10nyslus finally says that

the h~~~ mind cannot know the Good God as Ho real17 ls.

"Etentm

: IT~
' "",r-'.)
~,
oum. not •... ones omneo s1nt cntltatum, f)t ~n. ent.ltlltes (~,~

tCrlu:!.ncntur, 1. qui omni entltate su'bl1mlor est, omrwra
arcug! t ooeni t1onr.'Hn. ".53

S1nce God 1 s Bimself

£10

.c"l~

q:.ltJql.,..O

s'Upo!'ior" to

the ei'I'oats ot.' Hls f>\O~,1.."10tia thut ru,"Q x!lcnif'oct in €ill ~l:dnLs,
D1on;,"'Siu8 concludes that ut').t1 113 "~"Qr that

1't.'Hl!10n

really f'I.mneless.

Attor all tho names of the quallt1etl !'o\.md in crcaturen l:.a\'e been

predioated oJ.' Goa, fhUllly t.J:~) hur:.mn l1l1nd must conolude that it

can know nothing of' the c'''ue nature of: Ood.

God possesses all

names bocause He is the CAuse oJ.' all th1uga J He is without Da!ll8
bee~u8o He transcends altogether all the o!'i'eets ot H1s goodness

that the hu:num mind kn.ows.

"Hoe 19itu.r cum 8clrent th~ologl.

Deum laudant at tamquam nomine oarentem, at ab omn1 n{'lmine."54
In the 'Writings of DlorJ781us the arr 1 rrnatl VI) th801ogy,

1M hleh

attributes to God all the names attributed to ereatu:res thet He
causes. thus

t1nd~

its

count~~part

1nt hA negatIve theology,

wh1ch ut')nies all the nlunes thus p'hrfln.

Th~ neeatl VEll

theolo£'7

thus lead.e to a higher knowlodgo ot God.
Zhef'& is

,ttO dCly1nt.~

t.h&

faot that .for Dlonyslua the

11& ~.i.a.t1oll.i..." leemingl;y takes all J:lJan1nC

-

...

1

I

f

••• ,

T $l II",

QVHiJ

from tbe ~

!:!_
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fircationla.
God

7~ere1.y

When D10nyslus expla1nsthe y!!

Negat1o~~~,

he make.

Thus the perfections

the unknown cause of all things.

in God a.""e not known; God, e s a cause of all things, is perfect
and has perfections onl'r in so tar as He is a c Quae of all ;Jer...
fecti!:ms in things.

Dionysius never stopped to make a c l€~t!'-cut

distinction betwc::n the PUl'.fGctiOll which is

cd

l'1alUler

it was

kno,:,:~

a.nd t

:l'l"~

:.. ~,:r.:llt;

in whlch t!'1at porfection Is found in crcatu!'es.

rath~}r

Thus

tlif'.ficult for h1;n to predicate these perfections

found in croat:"lres as per1\)ctions ':::'cu."1d also in. the Good God.
Nor yet docs the mina of Dlonysius rest in the quost
for the knowlede:e of God.

Dionysius goes on to show tha t thcI\'.:'i

iA still a higher way, the way of mystical theology, which unites
us more

co~npletelY'

with the Good.

us to know the nature of the Goed
1n creatures.

The way of affirmation leads
f!::l

the cause of all perfections

The way or neFation shows that the nature of the

Good is not the same in Rny way as t hat found in t he effects of
that Good found in creatures.

Finally. the way of superexeel-

lence or 5uper'eminence leads to the I!lystieal insi;":ht into the
tr'J.e nat'ul'e of the Good.

Throur:;h the mystical way of superex-

ce12ence the human soul is tul1 ted to the 'transcendent
God.

11~1e

only

Wtl.y

nat.~re

of

in whi.ch the soul c an be united to God :1.n this

mystical way is by excess

01'

love; since

10\"6

is the cause

01'

this

union, Dio!lYS ius explains the place of love in his philosophy.
Love alone is 'the way to the last, the h1shest, tile l'f.!.ost per.fect,

the most profound knowledge of God. 55
In so far as He is transcendent,
He cannot be named, He is t he great "Unnamed."
But the names that we give to God never attain the lotty sublimity of God. OUr knowledge - .. intelloctual e. S \7e11 as our phantasms -- are far short ot' God's utter super...
ex.ce11ence; love, and love alg!l9, is able
to un! ta us vl1 th the d.i vine. 5
Thus for Dlonys ius the third way in t he line of kno\,.

ledge of

l:1tUl

leads to th~ sllpore1~lnont, t:::-anscondont. di'vine

nature of God.

For him thero Is s. (.2.cfinltc pro£l'o,:sion that

;~VtJl>y

bair1t; 13 e.. cood. Therefore, we sc..y
that the cause of it is the GOQU; next we

.lony thut the caUfJO is ;, 110 Goo<.1,; t;ut this
ndgation becorr.es in ltf) turn an affh'mation,
.ro.;.'" if Jod is not tpsc Good, 1 t is Lecause
He 1s the Supel"good • .?(

Thus in the language of Dlonysius" God as the cause ot'
all things would. bu the Good.

-

,

Cayre,

lO

u1d be denied

•

99.

transcendant" i1 est innommabte, Ie grand 'Anonyme t ;
, ••• Mais lea noms que nOlla donnons a. Dieu n f Ill'!'i vent JD..."'ll!lls
a 10. hcuteur de 1a tru.ruihcndance di "vine; no~ conna.lsiJances
,-- 1es intel1ectue11e.3 Souse! b1en que les im&gina.tlves __
cchouent devant la suracellonce de Dieu; saul lfal~ur est
capa.ble ~e nous unir au di vin.« 'l'h6ry, 93.
UChaquo etro oct un bien; noua J.il"'ons donc quo ea cause est
Ie Bien; puis nous nierons qu t elle solt Ie Dien; mais cette
nesation deviendra
son tour uno nfflI'rnat':'on, car" a1 l)1eu.
n1e::::c pas 16 .olen, c'e~t quHl t';st l'llyper:':'ien." ,:ilson, 32.
"COT:UUC

57

Butthon the Cood

a

!Ie wou.ld/6 said Lo
Good.

not only tb0 Good bu:1; evon the Supor-

CHAPTER IV

A COMPARATIVE STODr OF PLATO'S
SUPRElm GOOD AND DIOlfYSIUS'
GOOD

GOD

It someone were to take up a portr-al t ot a friend

painted when he was about five years old and compar-e it with a
portrait drawn thirty years later, he might find striking re.

semblances between the reature. or the two.
the two portra1ts are identioalll tha

No one would say that

fHllme.

The sleam in the

eye, the aqu1line nO.8, the little twisted &'11i1e on the cheeks
-. all the.e might atill be there on the portrait of t he mature

man. But yet thay would not be the

8tUle.

The older teatut'e8

would resem.ble the '1outhrul features, but their proportion would
be much greater.

80th pictures would Pl"Otrt17 one and. the same

man but at dirterent stases or hi. ltt ••

60
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A 81milar comparison can be made bet•• en the philo-

.ophy or Plato -- the portrait ot a youthful ph1losophy ... and
the more mature and more completely developed philosophy of

.tus _. the portl"ait ot a matupe phIlosoph,..

DiO%l7~

Rven though thtlre

i8 a :resemblance, a marked s1r.rl.larl ty, between the two men, still

they are not identioal.

Whereas Plato sugGested or poInted to a

possible .olution or merely hlnted at an Idea, DlonT81u8 oertifled, drove on to a 10gloal conolusion, and explained his ideas
as much .s he was fbIe.

or

tx-ait

Tho portral t ot the 70uth and the por-

the man show marked resemblanoe..

But

m&llr

changes

bad taken place trom the t 1me tha t Plato started hi. career to
the time that DlonysIu8 completed his work.

The thought of

Plato had passed through the minds ot many great thlnkel's" and.
as a result had become much more p:roJ.'ule and more developed than
when Plato had expressed his 1deal tor t be .first time.

Yet de.

spite this trenwndoUB change end despite th.e f act the D1on"s1u8

was

80

greatly influenced by tho followers of Plato, the Neo-

platon1st", the resfJmblance 1s nonetheless there.

However, it

must be remer..'lbered that tho moro mature thinker, D1orqslu8, had
at his: hand th$ t ru1ts ot many great mind. that had added 1n

lome instance. clarity and depth to the thought of their master,
Plato, and in other instances, obscurIty and superficialIty.
First ot sll, we can aee
the

I

tages ot knowledge

or

til

marked stmllarity between

:?lato and the motions of the soul in

--------------------........
62
Dl011yslus.

In both these 18 de1'"1nlte scale starting w1th sense

percoption and concludlnE with t°he knowledge of the ultlnllite
pr1nciple, the Good.

'lato divide. the lower division ot his
,

I

,

11ne Into two parts __ ~I.K"'(f"Lct. and7T,cn:,s.

The

rOl'm$l:"

stage

J!le-

ters to the "shadows and t hen reflections in water and on surtaoe. ot dense, smooth, and br1ght texture, and everythlng of
that kind."l

The latter rorers to t he "animals about us and all

plants and the whole calss of Obj~Ct8 made by nan. tt2

The co:r-

responding .tage 1n the system ot Dlonysius 1.8 t he movement of
the aoul

",~l1ree,~e."

This one movement InDIol1ysiu8 t plan in-

cludes the two lowest stae,as ot Plato's 80ale.

Dlonyslul suma

up the two lowest stages of Plato by usIng .the general phrase

and

I

"'''1:,S

1n one motion or ths a Qui.

Dlroecte vero mO'\f'.tur, quando non ad attlpsum lngred1tur, neque alntulax-1 motu
eplrltall rOl·tur, IS ad ad ea quae ips!
v10tna aunt progred1tar, at a rebus oxtern!8, non secus so signis qu1buadam
varlla
ac lIlUltip1101bus.
(J..".;' rwv 3
»
.d~'
:t.
I.l
l
)
,f

Iw u,fy

aecause

w"'"~P

or

I

e(TJD

'r'vwv

,

(/'1IJ.(

IvD/tW~

tilts 'JIlthea1a, the second mot1on ot the

80ul to%' DloDJ81u8 corresponds to t he third atage ... J, ~ vo'col."

ot Plato •• divLded lin..
...

£

q'l

• $'

,

.1.

Dionyslu8 calls this motion an

"oblique" motion ot the

$

oui.

6,3
In this stage tor nato the IS oui

mu.t "1nve.tlgate b7 treating a8 1mages the things 1mitated 1n

the tormer

dlvl.10n~

and b7 means of usumpt10ns fl'Om whlah it

prooeeds not up to • first prinoiple but down to a oonelu81on. n4

The movement or the soul 11 the lame tor D1oD,.81ua, "Ob11que varo
c1etl..1l'- animua, quando pro captu auo notlonlbua dl vini. 11iu.tr......
tur,

DOll

apiritali qu1d_ un1to modo, .ed cog1tando et d1aclU"l"en-

do quaal perm.lst18 tluxiaque actlon1bu.... $
st~ge

F1nal11. the highest

ot Plato brings the soul to the knowledge of the highest

pr1nciple.

It advances trom ita usumptions to a
beg1nnlna or prinoiple thattrDnacends
a8stmaptlon, and in wbtch 1t maluus no us.
of the lmaa.' emplOJed~ the other sect1on,
re171ng on 148a8 only
. progressing s,...tem.aticall,. t hrougb ideas.

DioD,,81ua, on the other hand, expands and. explains
the highest movement ot the soul a little more tull.,_
Anim1 autem JIOtua orbicularis eat e jus

ab

1n aemet1peum lntro1tu.,
lps1ua tacultatum untmoda
1nt'lexio, quae quae1 11'1 C 1roulo t1xum et
ab omn1 errore l1berum motum .1 trlbuit,
et a mult1. rebus extrane1, lpSU8 convert1t ae coll1g1t pr~ a4 .e, delndef
qua.i jaa unlua modi etfectu., conjunct4a
uno modo tacultat1bua, conjunglt, atque .
ita demua ad pulohrum ac bonum manuduolt,
quad 8upt'a omnia quae 8unt et unum ftt idem,
.!t a1ne principio et s1ne fine est;f
ext~anel.
.plr1tall~e

Hence tor both philosophers the f blal

stt1ljJ

ot cognition leads

to a unity, a princ1plo ot being by which evel'ythlne; else 1s

unified.

POl"

botb men tbe tinal .tage consists of a simple grasp

and an intuition of' an llmlaterlal nature which 18 intelligible

1n 1taelr.

Despite the tact that for Plato the object of th1s

intu1t1on 18 the ideas, whioh

a:N)

dlstlnct from the soul, while

for Dlonyslus the object 18 tho.oul It.aU and 1 ts own powers,
still both philosophers ultltUltely- terminate in tho intuition

at

the prinolple

at unity, the 1dea ot goodness.

But befoFe the comparison 01' tht. first pr1nciple

the works

or the two men 18 made, a

word must be said about the

atage of knowledge that 18 Just below the flnal stage.
been shown that between t he sphere

1n

It has

ot aeneat10n and t he ultimate

sphere ot knowledge, Plato puts an intermediate, the sphere of
ideas.

In these ideas the beings ot the lower atagea partic1-

pate in greater or less degree.

Although a tew oommentators

interpret Plato as Ineaning that thesa ideas have ex1stence onl,.
1n the mind conceiving them, the muoh more common interpretat1on.

and the one that follow. the m.ost ouv10ua 8ense of the text, i .
that they have rotil existence independent of tho mind.

case this much 1s certain.

In an,.

Plato explains the perfections in

the lower stageo by meal18 of tho ideas.

Of this wo are certain

whethex' the tdeas exist Qutei\le the mInd

<,'11'

not.

An anal)"sl. of' Dlonyalua ahows thst he holds a very
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.tmila~ doet~1ne ot ldeaa. 8

Between the hl~~o8t princIple, the

t l~st caua. ot all things, and t ho part! culars which are round
in the lowest stage ot baiopa, Dlon.,81u8 places the universal
Idea. a& forms.
aut POl' 8e

v1t~

pro~sua

"Q.uaerti& autem quid

dicamua pert .8 es •• ,

aut quaecunque absolute at principallter .8S8,

at ex Oeo ac primo creata

688e

ponimua."9

ne

Rnawera the que ..

t1cm. by _:ring that thoa€) 1doas Including the idea ot
p~edlcat&d

o£ tho first cause in

pate in the t lrst oause.

80

boms

~

.fal" aa t hey also partici-

Juat as all partioulars are partici-

pations ot the first caus.,

80

a180

are

the Ideas participatIons

or It, Hence the Good, which 18 the fIrst cause, i8 the author
ot these 1deas and ot all particular being. a8 nll.

"Quamobl'••

bonu. ille et ipsorum quae prima aunt auctor esse d1cItur, de1nde

GOrum

quae generatim et un1verse ll1a part1cipant, postea

sorum quae in parte."lO

Thull the 1deas are the first and the

h1ghest part1cipations of the Good.
the verY' f1rst beings,
6xistence. which the,.

~f).~ y ,/(~:, ."11
•

_.

•

aOI

•••• u,.

•

I

~,

"The DI0ft781an torms are

T .. 7rfunw~ ~".A,
pOa$EHUJ

the very f'lrtst to rece1ve

in this wa7 ""l'wrUJ),~1To>'VzUJS /(a~
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Yet for D1onys1us-there 1s no quest10n of the real
existence of the 1deas.
an 1nterpretation as

80

Where Plato 1s obscure and open to such

many commentators have ot his fantastic

conceptions, Dionysius is much more definite and more easily
comprehens1b1e,

He ridicules those

mlO

would make gods or cre-

ators of these ideas, as so many ot

th~

ancient philosophers had

done even before the time of Plato, and himself insists that they
do not exist; "quippe

Ctl.Dl

non essent."12

In this treatment ot the ideas can be recognized the
doctrine ot the divine ideas.

With Dionysius these ideas are

like the l1nes radiat1ng fro:11 the c enter of a c1rcle.
as the lines are unified by the point in the center,
1deas unified by the source trom which they come.

Just
80

are the

The Good 1s

the center trom which radiate the many lines which are compared
to the ideas.
Et est ex ipsa at in ipaa ipsum per se
esse, et rerum principia, et omnia quaecunque sunt, at quae quomodocunque 8unt}
idque incomprehense, at copulate, et singulariter ••• Et in centro omnes lineae circuli
una copulatione airJul e.xistunt; at punctum
habet omnes reetaa lineae uniformiter copulatae
inter se, et cum uno principio a quo exi~runt,
at in ipso centro omnino copulatas sunt. I )
But this must be remembered in the consideration of t his comparison.

-

12

The ideas as compared to the radiations from their center,

De D1v1n1s

13 V; 5.

L

Nom1n1bu~;

XI, 6.
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the Good, are really distinguished from that oenter and are also
subordinate to it because all depends on the position and the

existence of that center.

Thus all ideas depend on and exist

because of the existence of the Good.

"The ldeas, then, repre-

sent so many dl vine rays, hardly separated .from their center,
although they are already quite distinct from it."l4

In hls

treatment ot the ideas, therefore, DlonysluB, so it seems, has
taken a position midway between an exaggerated interpretation ot
the Platonic ideas -- the interpretation whichw ould ma.l{e the
ideas entities that are really eXisting outside the mind of the
one conceiving them -- and the position ot Saints Augustine,
Bonaventure, and Thomas which identifies the divine ideas, which
are the exemplary forms tor all things whether actual or possible
with God. 15
The final stage of cognition for both Plato and Dion}".
sius leatis to the knowledi;.e ot the first principle ot all things.
For t he one it is the Supreme Good and tor t he other the Good
God. 16

Aetne first principle and bef.;inn:t.ne:; it 1s the cause ot:

all t hinge; this both philosophers teach very clearly.

, L

~

~L.s

I

I

Yet once

,

1dees representent done autant de rayons divine, a pe1ne
el01gn~s de leur centre, mala qui sten dlstinguent pourtant
d'J~." G1lson, 84.
15 fibid., 8).
16 ereatter, wben the good refers to the ultimate principle in
the philosophy ot both men, the word will be written 'Vlth e.
capital letter.
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again the paucity of words on this point andwnnt of clearness
of expression

~n

the part of Plato is in marked contrast to the

superabundance of worda and clarity of explanation by Dionysius.
Plato vex'Y simply states the fact that the Supreme Good is the
cause of all thlngs. 17

In the first instance of such a stater.1ent

he ll1akes a comparison ot the causality of' the Supreme Good with
that of the sun:
.... the Sun 1s not Vision, but it is the
cause of vision and also is seen by the
vision it causes. It was the Sun, then,
that I meant when I spoke of that offspring
which t he Good has created in the visible
world. to stand there in the same relation
to vision and visible things as that that
the Good itself bears in the intelligible
world to ntelll gence and to intelligible
Objects.

1s

In the analogy Plato seems to have obscurad the nature of' the
causality of the Supreme Good.
Supreme Good is the cause not

Once again be says that the
onl~

of the knowledge of things

but also of their very essence and existence.

flThe Objects ot

knowledge not only receive their being known from the presence
of the Good, but their very existence end essence 113 deri ved from

17 Republ1c, 5160.
18 RepuBlIc, 5a8a.

The translation of this sect10n 1s from
Cornford, The Re~UbliC of Plato, Oxford University
Press, New York, 2w.
lioreY'strans!ation of the clause
"
:>.n '
~
,
:> , \
C
.....
1 s "hi
~"
-r--<'Y4l4DOV I.yl.vv"r~l' .tVA,,/IO!OV
~.vr't'
Wl c h th e
good begot to btand in a proportion with itself." The translator has missed the "analogy" in order to preserve the Greek
\'1101·<1 order.

~rancls

L
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it to them. t119

sun.

Finally, he again makes the comparison with the

"Once it is perceived (the Supreme Good), the conclusion

must follow that, .cor ::.111 things, this is the caUSE) of whatever
is ri£ht and cood; in the visible world it gives birth to light
and to the lord of liGht, whileit is itself sovereicn in the intelligible world and the parent of intelligence and truth. H20
Plato, then, mer'ely keeps arfirI!linS that the Supreme Good is
the cause of all things

-.71-.fI'''",fI' ~lr,o" ... -

without sayinr- tl.uch

more.
When Dionysius explalnsthe causality of the Good -and he does it quite frequently -- he penetrates to the problem
a little more t horoughl,._

He does not merely say that the Good

1s the cause of all things "'-7T.("r~" ""r~LO"-- but that it 1s the
efficient cause ..-

c

W!»

"
.".",,,rc.l(ofl' -<',Lelf

the motion of all things.

-- as well as the cause of

Here he uses tho expressions K'fI'o'U"

Besides, it is the final oause of all things
\

'

~t,,'KOV'

r'Kov

n
",,,nov -- and

the exemplary cause as well .-

... -

c

wS

r
TTc,,,,, Oe.'!4t/.-

.21- Dionysiu3 is quite emphatiC about the causality of the

Good; he repeats tho idea over and over again.

Not only that,

but he gives examples of each kind of causality the Good oxercisss •

..
19

20

$09B.
ReEub1ic, $17C. This passage is also taken from Cornford.
<Snce again Shorey fo11ow~ the strict Greek word ollder and

21 ~s5fvrgtsfi~i!nf£u~~eI\~0¥~t.
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••• at cuncta in Ipsum Intuantur, at ab
1pso movantur at conservantur, at ipsius
gratia at propter ipsum at in ipso omne'
prinCipluz exemplare, r1nale, afflciens,
formale, materiale, et don1que omne prinelplum, omnls conservatio, omnis finis, at,
ut summatlm dicam, omnia quae aunt, ex pulchro at bono exsistunt, et o:r.rnia quae non
aunt in pu1ehroet bono sunt, suparsubstanji&.l,1 tar; at est omnium pr1nc1pium (rr.(v'Cc.AJV'
«p~n)
supraquam pr~~clpale et finis
supraquam perreetus.

,

.:.

Not only is the Good the cause of things

o

7T.(",-

but more specifically it is the cause of all good
things just as thoroughly as it is not the cause of evil things.
Jam vero pro modulo nostro satis laudatum
est bonum, in quantum vera admlrandum, ut
principium at finis olr'.nium, ut reru..l'l'1 omnium
complexus, ut formana res non exsistentes,
ut causa bonorum omnium (~~ 7T'.(Y;;WlI itX..{ 6):;:'",
«~/r,ov ), ut nullius mall cauaa (~S"CW V I'(CI<i:JlI
~v~:r'ov ), ut providentia at bonltss ab.
soluta, quaequJlt omnia, tam quae aunt quam. non
sunt, superat.~
The reason why Dionysius introduces this idee. of the Good as s.

non-cause (~v.~~,~v) is that the negation or the negative side
of the causality exercised by the Good and its very natu.re as a

cause superior to all its effects is t he basia of the
tionis.

ll!.

Ne~~

In other words, a further insight into the n&.ture of the

Good can be had by the negation of all the qualities found in in-

-

IV, 10.
1,·3.
IV,

.35..

71
terior be1ngs, the effects of the Good.
The exercise of the causul1ty of the Supreme Good In
the works of Plato 1s such that "the objects of knowledee not
only

recl'~lve

from the presence of the Good their being l(nown,

but their very existence and essence

(,/(4'•

~~rf~v) 1s derived to them from It."2S

'

r4t

?
t,., "'A'

,t

,.

K-'-(

~

nv

Even if it is Eranted

that in the Platonic concept of being the notion of existence is
not used to mean the exercised act of existence for a reel being
but rather the mere intelligibilIty which saves the beine' in be-

oomin£: from non-being,26

still the Suprem& Good exer::!ises com-

plete and ultimate causality.

From ell indications neither Plato

nor, for that matter, any of the Greeks, ar1"1 ,~ed at the cor:.cept

of existence as an. exorcised act, as did the le.tar Christian
ph1losopheJ's .2.7

Dianys ius uses a terrninology identical with the. t of
Plato.

He says the. t "dum 111a.:m appetunt .. tam ut slnt qu.am ut

>.
quantum fas est, conformantur. n28

effusive..

obtinent, nec non illl

Then again he becomes more

"Ex eo qu,i est, aevu.rn,
. et substantia, at existentia,

et tempus, at generatio, at quod gignitur. tt29

These are but a

25

Re~ub11c, 509B.
26 aI son, The 5sirlt of Mediaeval Philosoph:, ScribLer's

27

28

New York;-t9I ' , 4.31:- '
See Gilson, ffBeing and Its Necasei ty,"

De Divln1s Nomln1bus. IV, 1.

29 V; 4.

.

ill.2.., 42-6,3.

~ons,

12
tew examples ot a theme Dlonyslus

constantly; the whole

~epeat8

ot the fifth chapter in a disoussion of the natura and partioipation of being in the Good is on t.his topio.

Though Dlonysius

does use the terminology of Plato, and even thoueh the 10""1ca,1

conclusion with regard to the notion of existence shoulc
same

as

t·c;~he

the conolusion of the earlier Greek philosopher, still

he did not himself draw such a. conclusion.

Christian backgr-ound that wLsh1s, he

WDS

~11 th

the aid of the

able to see t he nec-

essity of some interpretation of the Platonic and Neoplatonic
ideas.

A more thorough study of his notion of being

wo~ld

have

to be made be.f'ore the conclusion could be drawn that he has lnade

the same mistake as was made by Plato.

To go into a thorough

atud7 of being would take us into considerations of contingency,
analogy, and participation, allot which would take us too rar
afield ot our present interest.

However, a few ideas a bout Plato' 5 and D1cnysius t concept of being will help in our understandinr of the1r idea. of
the Good.

~.i'or

these philosopher's the notion of bolnS certainly

does not mean thB oI'dination of an essence to an existence.

Such

a doc'trino leads to tho conslusion oJ: a Being in whom essence is
identified with
~d

ex.:l.s(.;e~~eJ

such a being is Crod.

l,"ior both Plato

Dionysius all di£ferences in the notion of being lay outside

the notion o.l' being.

Therel'oJ:'e, t he notion of non-ens, which

:rami!' les from the not.ion of the GOou., takes on the meanir!b ot' a

L
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potential ena.
amount of

The notion of being takes on the meaning of the

p~rticlpatlon

of a creature in being.

Pure being,

that is complete being, ls not, then, identified with God, for
pure being does not carry the notion of full

exi~tence.

Since

being is limited in some respect by n9n-being, something of
greater extension must stand above both ot them.

This isfue Good

which ramifies into being and non-being.
Even though both Plato and Dlonysius maintain that
trom the Good comes being, they also hold that the Good is not
belng.

Plato insists that "the Good is not the same thing aa

being, n30 even though it gives being to all things.

Dionysius,

on the other hand, says almost the same thing when he shows that
being is predicated ot God in the sense t hat He is t he cause of
all being and t hat, therefore, being 1s rather the first participation of God, and thus God gets the name of being through
participation.

God i8 being in the sense that all being is pre-

contained in His nature and through Him all things receive their
belng. 31 God t hen is pre-Being in the sense that He is the cause

at all being.
Neither philosopher stops at this negatt va side of the
na tUre of the Good.

30
31

_ -Republic,

509B.

Both ot them go on to show the. t the Good,

De ...................
15IVInis Nominibus.

v,5.
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even though it is not being strict1,. speaking, has a naturte that
transcends all being and thus lies beyond t he range of human intelligibility.

Plato expr'esses this idea when he explains t he

v

natur0 of the Good: "The Good 1s not the sarno thing as being but
even beyond ooin:::."

surpass in,

it in dignity and power. ".32

To

express the tr&lscendent nature of the Supreme Good, Plato uses
the Greek word

Dionysius uses the very same word in

expressing the transcendent nature of t he Good God: "BlL'l1ma omnium
(~7T..(~ruJv) ejus quae supra omnia (4-;r~KE'VCl(. 77•./vrwv) est t ot1us

Thus by its very nature the Good

proprietatis identitas."33

transcends all things, stands above being in the sense that it
gives being to all t hinga, and tra.nscends even non-being, which
strives for it as for an end.
When Plato once again ment10ns the Supreme Good, he
speaks ot 1t as a principle or "beginning that transcends as ..

sumptions

,

(41

,

~

,)

-'f,xnv

I

~

~y"1TD O'frov)~

34

The

id~a

that Plato seems

to be trying to get across is that the nature ot t he Supreme Gooct"
is

80

very Tal' above tr.l6 t hinge cognized by the human mind t:1at

the mind cannot really attain to

tr~e

knowledge of it.

again be hints at this inabi11ty of the human mind.

32 Republic, 509B.
33)

De

b!v!nls Nominibu8, II,

4. !fe"putl!c,

5trsa.

'

4.

Once

"In the re ...
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glon or the known the lu t thing to be seen and hardly to be seen

(,Il.;!'~ o,;'r9<lL) is the idea of' the oood."35
the tact that even though the mind

Jo~s

Plato is hinting .. t

come to the first prin-

ciple of all things, t he nature of t bat .fIrst prInciple so tI'ansconds all knowledge that only a. ve:.'] little can be known atout it.

As always, D10ny-sius expresses the very same idea with
8uperlati va fT ce.

The princ iple or beginning of all things is

for him not only the naturethat tranacends assumption, but it 1s
the auperessential, superoriginal principle ot all things:

"Omnia

principii Buperessentialiter superorlginale prinoiplum (itpxn~

_71"'''''5
"

c'

lJ"t.p"aN"'UJ~ lJTrE.f"'fX'OS
C

,

"
) .36
.f
X1fJ"

Th
f act i s tuu.t
"'-- DioIl7....8

slue so otten mentions the "absolute no-thing which is above

reality" and the " all.. transc ending hiddenneas of the all-tra.nscending supereasant,lally supaI'existing super-Diety, "37 that one
begins to suspect that either agnosticism or scepticis!l should

be the logical result 01 his insistence.

So strong and persist-

ant isthe idea of the transcendence, ineffability, and incom-

prehens1tl1ity of the Good God

tr~t

"one should not say anything

nor even think anything about God. ".38

~5

517B.

~7

-rnge,

30 De

~8

Di~ln18 Naminibus, I, 3.
Il~.
'II

"Il ne taut rlen dire, ne moms rion penser de D1eu," X. Le
Bachlet "Dieu, Sa Nature dfapren les P~re8," Dlctlonna,1.re
de TheoloSie catholltue, ed. by A. VaC8.11t.et E. Mangenot,
mra1~!'e !:eto"uzey e 'Xne, Paris, 1933, IV, eol. 111.:3.

Another point should be mentioned here while the idea

ot t he transcendent nature of the Good is being discussed.

As

shown, Dionysius first ot all admits that the perfections found
in creatures can be predicated ot God,

Then he comes right back

and denies that such a predication can be made because of the

transcendent nature of the Good Godlotl{ o~"itov

KlI":WS

lh,[f ."39

Though at first sight the argument seems to be a vicious circle
and a contradiction, it has to be interpreted as Dionysiu8 meant
it to be,

The basis of the distinction is the idea of analogy

between t he perfections found in creatures and t he perfections
of God.

The s1milar1 ty of the analogy is the t oundation of the

way of affirmation; the dissimilarity is the way of negation.
In truth, there is only an apparent eon....
tradiction since the terms do not have
exactly t he same essential meaning in the
way of affirmation as in the way of nega-tion. God 1s not a living being like those
we know through our experience, and yet He
is living in another way. Transcendent to
the categories in which we call all beings,
He is not, however, completely alien to
them, tor their perfection comes from Him.
He resembles, them and yet He does not resemble them. 4U

.39 De Di vim. Nomin1bU8, IV, 1.
40 "'En' realite', it niy a contrad.iotion qu t en apparence, parce

que les termes n'ont pas exactement 1e mSme sens dans l'arfirmation at dans 1a negation. Dieu nt.st pas un ~tre
vivant comma ceux que nous connaissons par experience ,t~
pourtant~ 11 est vivant autr~ment.
Transcendant aux categories ou nous c;assons les etres, i1 ne leur est pourtant
pas tout
fait etranger, car leur perfection vient de lui.
11 leur ressamble et 11 ne leur ressemble pas." Arnou,
col. 2374.

a
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Dionysius insists as much on the negative way as on
the affirmative way because for him the negative way means that

in God there must be a superabundance of being, 11fe, intelligence and so of all the other perfections found in creatures.
For Dionysius t he negative way is the negation of impertection.41
It is because of the negative way that the human mind finally.
comes to the highest and most perfeot way ot the

knowled~e

of

Ood. the way of excellenoe already :mentioned, c haracterlzed by
the use of the word

"

> ,
..
1J7TI!,f."

Yet, in spite of all his enthu-

siastic expression, Diollysius has opened the door to an agnostic
interpretation of his philosophy_
,

I

The term. t1JTr£P' so characteristic or
the language of Dlonyslus indicates
that absolute transcendence thnt makes
ot God the great unknown -- as ScotU8 says,
'The Ur~owablet -- but not, entirely inaccessible; for indeed love penei)rates
right into those regions which are impenetrable to reason and the intelligence;
and it is due to the very fact that God is
transcendent to all realities which can become the objects of QUI' human intel11gence,
that in speaking or Him our negations will
be more correct than our aff1rmations.
Nonetheless, in this event our negative concepts do not indicate in God the absence of
being or ot goodness ••• This not1on of the
negative theology, based on the principle
ot the transcendence of God, 1s preeminently a vital thought ••• but it is, nonetheless, dangerous in its termlnology and

4.1

Q! Di v~nls nomini bus, IV, 3.
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in its proximity to agnosticlsm.42
Although Dionyslus' seeming agnosticism can be explained in a way that frees him of such a charge, another difficulty
can be proposed which is a bit more difficult to get around.
Earlier in this atudy it was shown that Plato compared the over flow of the Good upon all things to the radiation of the sun upon
a.l1 visible creetures. 4.J

How such a comparison, which is

80

characteristic of the Platonists and the Neoplatonists, 1s unfortunate for D1onysius.

\f.hen Dionysius uses it. he adds a noto

that Plato does not himsel.f add when he makes the ve!'Y same comparison.

Dlonyslus says this:
Quemadmodum en1m sol ille noster non
cogitatione aut voluntate, sed eo ipso
quod est, iliuminat wllversa quae quoqqo
modo lucia ejuB sunt capacia; sic etiam

;,

I

I

"La terme 11"£:"{' si characteristique de la langue dion'1s1enne,
indique cetta absolue transeendance qui fait de Dieu Ie grand
inconnu -- Scot d1t: l'lnconnaifsable -- mais non toutefo18
ttinacc6ssibleJ,car ltamour p~netre dans des regions ferm'••
a la raison et a I'intelligence, et clest parce que Dieu est
transcendant
toutes les r~aIitJs qui peuvent taire I'objet
de nos connaissances humaines, quten parlant de Lui nos nlgationa seront plus j~stes que nos affirmations} ma18 dans ce
cas nos conscepts negatirs, ne voudront pas signitier en
Dieu ;tabsence d'~tr. ou de bont~ , •• Cette concept1on de
la theologie n~gative, fond4e sur le principe de 1& transcendance de D1eu, est par excellence un concept vital, •••
lnais dangereuse cependant dans ses expressions et par son
vois1nage avec ltagnostlcisme." Thery, 105-106.
R~publ,lp, .s08:s...C.

a
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ipsUDl bonum ipsamet substantia sua, rebus
omnibus. pro cujusque eaptuI"totius bonitatis auas radios afrundit.~
This very comparison has been the souroe of much controversy over the doctrine of Dionysius.

If he means that God

pours out His goodness upon things just as the sun pours out its
light "non cogitations aut volu:r,tate," then there is S81"'ious
question ot t he liberty ot God.

Now Dion7sius may have been in-

terested in only one part of the comparison and did not realize
all its

consequ~nce8.

As much can be suspected when the phrase

"non cigitatione aut voluntate" 1s seen.

Perhaps he meuns the

"non cogitatione aut voluntate" to reter totbe sun and not be
carried over with t he comparison to mean t hat the Good "non cogitations aut voluntate" pours out its goodness on creatures.

The

example may be just another case of Dionysius' superlative language that has given grounds for such misinterpretation.

But i t

by this expression Dionysius really means to say that the Good
God "without reason or will" pours out His goodness, than it seems
that God would be necessitated in sharinG lIis goodness with creatures.

It would follow, then that the Good God is forced Ly Ilis

very nature, sinee His nature is goodness itself, to follow the
law that goodness must reproduce itself.

I f that 1s

w}~t

D1ony-

sius means, then God must of necess1ty pour His goodness on creatures.

44

-

"The danger was to enter into the spirit of the primitive
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thesis even to the point of denying the liberty of God and of
making the creation of t he

VI

arld a necessary radiation o£ the

divine and sovereign pert'ection. n45

It does not seem, in the

light of the Christian background of Dionysius, that he wou!d
admit limitation in the Good God even though he leaves himself
open to such an interpretatlo~.46
From what has been sald so far, it is very evident
that both Plato and Dionyslus hold the
their metaphysical systems.

prim~cy

ot the Good in

Because of the goodness of this

first principle and because ot the fact that it ls good by its
very nature, all belngs are what they are.

"It is from the very

e )
-r
,
,
f act that He .."~S goodness b
1 His essenCe,c.&I5
4>zJf"UldI.S _1'«,9."'"

at all times lIe by His very llatuI'o

45

po~s

that

out lIis goodness upon

I

"Le danger atait drentrer dans l'esprlt de 1& formula pru.ltlve jusqufa nler 10. liberte divine et
faire de 1& production de mende un rayonnement necessaire de la sover.1ne perfection.- Arnou. col. 2361.
It is important to remember that this is but one small passage from out ot.' an entire treatise. If· this question is
judged in the light of the entire treatise, Dion1sius1 orthodoxy on t he question is established. "S. Dionysium non
voluisse excluders a Deo electionem Simpliciter, ac 8i Deus
non libere sed necessario res creatns produxlsset, sed electionem secundum quid, in quantum scilicet non tantum quibusdam creatur1s bom.itatem suam communicat, sed omnibus,
prout scilicet alectio dlscretlona quamdam importat; nam
a11oquiD, ut'lbldem bene probnt D. Thomas, Deus, CUll sit
pr~ agens, per lntelleotum at voluntatem cuncta causare
dicendue est." Corderius, 158.

a
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all oreatures."47

In spite of the tact that both hold to the

primacy of t he Good, t hey do not seem to see in it any grounds

or

limitation.~

Yet .• God must be perfection, its fulfillment,

and complete realization, God must be infinite perfection.
To insist on the primacy of the Good -- as both Plato
and Dionysius do -- means the insistence on the idea of a perfection wbich implies limitation in God.
first and foremost

and

For it God is

~ood.

before He is being, w hat in the Good is

the object of Godls desire tn the creation of beings Which participate in His goodness?

Obviously, if goodness is in the pri-

macy, there would be no reason wi thin itself to communicate its
goodness to others.

The object of Godts desire, similarly, would

be outside Himself.

(tod, t hen, would not create freely.

However,

suoh limitations would not be in God if Being is the first and in
the prtmacy, for

l~ing

is at once both aot and the cood -- act

defines the intrinsic nature ot' God and good defines the objeot

ot His desire.

God as Being has, therefore, within Hir:lselt a

reason for the exercise ot IUs causal power.

God as goodness

would have a reason outside Himself.
Then again, if the Good is t he ultimate reason for all

47

REt c'est pare. qutil est 1a bonte par essence,~~ O~.l~SfS
1t,-.lJ6%, qu'11 lui appartient de repandre Ie. bonta' sur tous
Ies etres." La Bach1et, col. 1125.

things, what explains the nature of the Good itaelt?

If' it 1s

Supreme Goodness, lt must have perfeotion of itself and not received perfection.

Otherwise it would bo llmited by the per-

fection from which it receives perfection.
perfection.

Now existence is a

Whs. t, t ben, explains the existence of t he Supreme

Good if Being is but the first participation of the Good?

Is

existence, then, something completely foreign to the notion of
Being?

Pla-co does not answer these questions; the supreme Good

tor him tranacands all assumptions and that 1s all we know about
ita nature.

lor does Dlonysius answer this que.tion.

Instead,

he finds refuge in quoting Scripture and thus relies on authorit7
for his argument.

"Penetrated through and through with Platonism.

as he was, this Christian never rose above the idea. of the primacy of the Good, never' grasped the primacy of Be1nr,.tt48

Since

Dionysius discusses this idea as frequently as he does, we can
be almost sure that he did not see in it the grounds for limita...
tion of God.
Since this idea of the "beyondness," of the transcendence" of the Good, i8 80 very fundamental to tbose two philosophers, the traditional use of non-being has to be modified.
As has been shown; the Good lies beyond being, yet it is the

48

Gilson,!ll! Spirit

2!

Mediaeval !hiloscphl, 93.

8,3

source ot.' being.

It 1s onl,. natural to asle: 1n ,.That way the Good

dUral's trom being.

In other words, what enters into the notion

of the Good to distinguish it fram being?

The ditference that

arises t rom. the Good and being must also have its ultimate source

and end in the Good, or else the Good is not the final principle.
Now, the only thing opposed to true being is non-being.

And if

non-being is the difference that e xiats between the Good and
being, then non-beine has a nature aa well as being.

Therefore,

non.being cannot mean nothingness; rather it must have the mean-

ing ot "otherness," and thus would not tall within the concept,
of being.

Non-being must have a very definite sense,

For both

Plat;o and tor Dionysius non"",be1ng must be something having

"~an1ng and substance."49
The similarities between Plato's Supreme Good and
Dionysius 1 Good God are many and str'lklng, as this study has

brought out.

Yet in the light ot the discussion can the con-

clusion be drawn that Plato really meant the Supreme Good to be

the vert same I'Gal1ty that Dionysiu8 calls his Good God?

The

resemblance seems so striking that such a conclusion seems quite

tenable.

Although the eminent Platonic scholar, ProteasoI' Tay-

lor wrltes:"The transcendent source ot all reality and intel-

49

St~~zel:

110. (The author, obviously, does not use the word
substance in the philosophical sense of ~ub~tance as opposed
to accident. He uses it 1"'1er01), &.s Ii S'11l0nya fOr" the word
"meaning" or "value.")
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ligibi11ty of everything other than itself corresponds to the

!E! realissimum of later philosophy and its GOd,"50

is he not.

with a knowledge of philosophical history 1n his favor, reading
his own mind into the pages of Platots philosophy?

Profo~sor

Hardie treads a b 1t more s oftl,. 1n the hallowed sanc'tuary of
the

Supreme Good when he writes:

ul should like to say that it

(the Supralne Good) may nevertheless be fairly thought of as 'the

god recognized in Platonic philosophy. ,,,,51
interpretation is gi van by Stenzel:

A slightly different

"Although we have no right

to identify the idea of the Good in t.he

~eE.up11c

with t he God or

the Timaeus, some blend of religious elements with his philosophy was essentia.l to Plato in working out the vievi of the Idea

,...,

as transcending experience.""'"

It may be true that for the con-

Ii
I

venience of the Plato scholars, this un1tlcation of ideas, so

easily made, may oe a clarification ot their ideas, but to conclude that such was the mind

or

Plato is not licit.

Everyone can

see the~m1lari17 between the Supreme Good of the Republic,53 the
Beaut,. of the SlFPos1um which is "eternal, Wlproduced, and in-

destructible,"54

and the ·z~ ~)'".IJ;,," ot the ,Phaedo,wh1ch 1s a

!bertain abstract beauty and goodness and magnitude_ uS5

But 1t i8

50 Taylor, 289.
51 W.F.R. Hardie. A Studl of Plato, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
1936, 1;;6.
- -

52

Stenze1,·45.

55

~.,

5..3 Re,eu,.)11c, ';;09n.
.
54 tJenJii1In Jowett, The' pia10~ues 2! r.1a,t.'!' Charles Scribner· s
Sons .. 'liew York, 10'9'9', 2XO: 12.

100B.

altogether another thine to say that Plato himsolf sav, nnd acknowledged this siL:lilarlty or intended to identify these similar
principles.

Another student

ot the question;
"On

ot Platonism takes a different view

he does not seem

to want to commit himself.

the whole we may say that the question as to the x-elation in

Plato's mind between God and the Ideas, especially the Idea ot

the GOod, cannot be answered because the Platonic writings do not
supply materials for

judging~ ,,56

FinallY: in Shorey' s

oPinlon~

the pane of the scale tip to the very oppoeite position from that
which they had for Taylor.

"God and the Good, then, 8l"'e associ-

ated ideas that may seem to be identified
poetry and mystic devt)tion.

1~

the language

or

But the stat.ement that the idea of

the Good i8 God is meaningless. uS7
What then should be said finally abont the Supreme
Good of Plato?

The finest definite expression on this topic

seems to be the conclusion of Gilson; his. words seem to be the
most logical conclusion to ell the facts pointed out in the

study of Plato·s Supreme Good.

The force of his words

~ld

the

def1nitene88 of his decision show the determination of his con-

56

57

James Frazer, ~~c Growthot Plato's Ideal TheoEI, Uacnll1an
and Co., London, 19jO,!o~ ',"
'"
Paul 3norel! '{.hat Plato Said, University of Chicago Prens.
Chicago, 19j,:3', ~l.
-
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elusion.

"Assuredly, nothinc mn'e closely

l"'(~Ser:lblc!J

f.:,ho d cfinl-

tion of tho Chrlntian God than thls definition of the Good.

Yet,

when all is said, the fact ::-'omains t hat Plato himself has :never
called the Good a God. n58

Finally, one added point must be stressed lest th:ts

study of DionysiuB sive riso to a constant misconception
philosophy.

o~

his

In this study th£ similarities between Plato and

Diony-eius have been brOfJ.Bht into the limelight.

Yet, t}'e number

of dissimilarities 1s legion and also very remarkable.

Greatest

of all is the tact t hat Plato was a pagan, Dionysius a Christian.
And t hat makes all the intnense difference in the world.

When

Dlonysius speaks of love, union with God, praysl", and spiritual
light, he is speaking of realities Plato never dreamed of.

When

he speaks of God, he has t he revelation of t he New Testament to
help him to rea11ze who God is.

Plato had only the ftndings ot

the ear11er Greek philosopbers who were still cha.ined down to
the tangible things of t his earth.
~,

So even 'though the similar-

1tles are what t hey are, the dissimilarities keep the two men

apart in thought as much as t he eight centuries oi' t 1me keep them
apart in the pages of.' our history booka.

58

E. Gilson" God and Ph110sophI' Yale University Press, Nell
Haven, 19Lt10~.
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